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MILITARY VOTING AND THE LAW:
PROCEDURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
SOLUTIONS TO THE BALLOT
TRANSIT PROBLEM
R. Michael Alvarez,* Thad E. Hall,** and Brian F. Roberts***
I. INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that members of the military, particularly those
involved in conflict overseas, should be provided with the opportu-
nity to exercise their franchise.  Unfortunately, throughout history
military personnel have been prevented from doing so due to both
procedural and logistic hurdles, resulting in their franchise being
effectively “hollow.”  These difficulties came to the forefront of
public awareness during the 2000 presidential election controversy
in Florida when the ballots submitted by individuals living over-
seas—especially military voters—were seen as crucial to the elec-
tion outcome as the margin of potential victory was so small that
these ballots could turn the election from one candidate to the
other.1  Headlines at the time included: “Odds Against Gore Ab-
sentee Gains; Republican-Leaning Counties Appear to Have More
Uncounted Overseas Ballots,”2 “Bush’s Lead Swells with Overseas
Votes,”3 “Military Ballot Review Is Urged,”4 and “Examining the
Vote; How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee
Vote.”5
* Senior Fellow, USC Annenberg Center for Communication and Professor of
Political Science, California Institute of Technology.
** Assistant Professor and Research Fellow, Institute of Public and International
Affairs, University of Utah.
*** Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Utah.
1. See Dan Keating & John Mintz, Odds Against Gore Absentee Gains; Republi-
can-Leaning Counties Appear to Have More Uncounted Overseas Ballots, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2000, at A26.
2. Id.
3. Susan Schmidt, Bush’s Lead Swells with Overseas Votes, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2000, at A1.
4. Susan Schmidt, Military Ballot Review Is Urged, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2000, at
A1.
5. David Barstow & Don Van Natta, Jr., Examining the Vote; How Bush Took
Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at A1; see also
Kosuke Imai & Gary King, Did Illegally Counted Overseas Absentee Ballots Decide
the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election?, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 537, 537-49 (2004), available at
935
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ303.txt unknown Seq: 2 20-SEP-07 10:57
936 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
For many Americans, however, the controversy surrounding the
votes of military personnel and overseas voters, despite its impor-
tance, may have seemed both bewildering and esoteric.  The de-
bate centered not on the rather uncontroversial proposition that
military members living overseas should have the right to vote, but
on minute details: whether certain overseas absentee ballots were
valid, and could therefore be counted, if they lacked postmarks;
whether ballots were properly received within statutorily defined
time periods; and whether ballots were legitimate if missing a sig-
nature or lacking other statutorily defined characteristics.6  Such
matters are likely beyond the interest of the typical American.
Despite the apparent focus on minutia, these legal skirmishes
fought within the broader context of the recount battle impacted
substantive issues concerning whether military absentee ballots
could be counted, the resolution of which swayed the outcome of
the 2000 presidential election.7  Issues of equal protection, federal-
ism, and statutory interpretation played important roles in this liti-
gation and highlighted not only the plight of military voters in
exercising their right to vote but also the delicate, and often times
difficult, balance between federal and state election laws.8  The ten-
sion between allowing overseas votes to be counted, as required by
federal law, and ensuring a fair election that complied with state
law was at the heart of the debate and related litigation.9
This tension is not new and, as it relates to military voting, has
centered for years on the laws and procedures that individuals are
required to follow before they can vote.10  The often competing
federal and state statutory frameworks put in place to govern vot-
ing are critically important because they ultimately determine who
can vote, in what manner they can vote, and the requirements that
such votes must meet in order to be counted.11  In the past, many
states used hurdles, such as poll taxes, reading tests, and flat-out
intimidation to systematically exclude minorities and the poor from
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPPS%2FPPS2_03%2FS153759
2704040332a.pdf&code=601ede18746350f03592b187924f0996.
6. See Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 5.
7. See id.; see also Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp. 2d
1317, 1321 (N.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000); Bush v. Hillsborough
County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2000).  For a discussion
of these cases, see infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Parts III & IV.
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voting.12  Such “procedural limitations” were implemented to
make it more difficult, if not impossible, for targeted populations
to vote even when they were serving their country in the military.13
Allowing more military personnel to vote and attempts at gov-
erning the mechanisms for doing so at the federal level came into
conflict with the right of states to determine how elections were
conducted in the states.14  More recently, however, the effective ex-
pansion of voting rights in America overall, and granting the right
to vote to those eighteen years and older in particular, have re-
moved many of these improper procedural limitations and signifi-
cantly broadened the pool of potential voters, particularly among
those in the military.15
One difficultly in expanding the pool of potential voters is the
added burden of dealing with a voting population that is spread
across the globe in highly inaccessible areas.16  Such “logistical
challenges” necessitated new rules to facilitate voting for those in
the military living overseas.17  Indeed, logistical challenges related
to military voting have moved to the forefront and various laws
now seek to provide pragmatic solutions to logistical military vot-
ing problems.18  As seen in both 2000 and 2004, however, these
12. See generally V.O. KEY, JR. WITH ALEXANDER HEARD, SOUTHERN POLITICS
IN STATE AND NATION (1949); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS:  SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974).
13. See, e.g., SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND AMERI-
CAN NATIONAL SECURITY (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001).
14. See infra Part III.
15. While the Department of Defense does not provide specific information on
how many of its active duty members are eligible voters between the ages of 18 and
20, demographic information for fiscal year 2004 indicates that 112,128 active duty
enlisted members are between 17 and 19 years old and 461,930 are between the ages
of 20 and 24. See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., PERSONNEL AND READI-
NESS, DEP’T OF DEF., POPULATION REPRESENTATION IN THE MILITARY SERVICES
app. B, at tbl.B-22 (2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/prhome/poprep2004/down
load/2004appendices.pdf.  In 2004, 69.7% of new recruits were between the ages of
17-20 with 122,670 joining the active duty military. See id. app. B, at tbl.B-1.  There
were an additional 89,323 members of the reserve military in 2004 aged 17-20. Id.
app. C, at tbl.C-16.  Previously disenfranchised minority voters also make up a signifi-
cant percentage of the military, with African-Americans comprising 20.56% of active
duty enlisted personnel in 2004 with 243,486 members, plus an additional 18,286 of-
ficers. See id. app. B, at tbls.B-24, B-38.
16. Not only does this include members of the armed forces who might be serving
in remote regions of Iraq or Afghanistan, but it also includes those who are at sea (for
example in submarines) or those whose precise whereabouts might be considered
classified for security purposes.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
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pragmatic solutions have not been a panacea and logistical difficul-
ties remain.  If such problems are not addressed, the ability of mili-
tary members to have an effective franchise will be just as “hollow”
as it was when procedures intentionally kept military members
from voting.19  To address such problems, the federal government
must either attempt a similarly wide-ranging effort as it did during
the civil rights era including the potential for completely federaliz-
ing the process, a daunting task requiring both resources and politi-
cal capital, or find a less interventionist solution that still facilitates
military voting to a higher degree than is currently available.20
The most promising means of accomplishing the goal of facilitat-
ing military voting without such a large undertaking is using tech-
nology to overcome the logistical problems in overseas voting.21
Increased access to and use of technology have provided an oppor-
tunity to address such problems while still maintaining the federal-
ist system of election laws.22  Technology may ultimately be the
means of resolving this tension and ensuring that not only do mili-
tary voters have the ability to exercise their constitutionally guar-
anteed right to vote, but states can ensure fair elections that
comply with their individualized election laws.  Thus, in many
ways, military voting may need to become part of the e-govern-
ment revolution, with technology used to address bureaucratic and
logistic failures while still maintaining acceptable governmental
systems.23  Such technological solutions, however, are not univer-
sally accepted and have not yet solved all of the potential issues
with military voting.24
In this Article, we examine how the issue of military voting has
changed over time from one beset by procedural difficulties, often
intentional with states changing election laws to promote military
voting only within a given set of parameters and to restrict voting
by those deemed unworthy of the franchise, to a logistical and
technological issue that focuses on how new technologies can fully
facilitate military voting.  Part II of this Article will briefly outline
the scope of the military and overseas voting issue.  Part III will
outline and address the conflicting statutory frameworks between
federal and state election laws.  Part IV will discuss the history of
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Parts V & VI.
21. See infra Parts V & VI.
22. See infra Parts V & VI.
23. JANE E. FOUNTAIN, BUILDING THE VIRTUAL STATE: INFORMATION TECHNOL-
OGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 44-64 (2001).
24. See infra Part VI.
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military voting from the beginning of America to the most recent
conflicts.  Part V will analyze recent problems and legal disputes
arising from the logistical problems associated with military voting
and local election laws.  Part VI will discuss recent attempts to use
technology to solve these problems with varying levels of success.
Finally, Part VII will discuss the lessons learned from these at-
tempts and look to the future of military and overseas voting in
light of the upcoming 2008 presidential election.
We argue that major wars have spurred changes in the election
process and that, after universal military suffrage was achieved, the
federal role in military voting has moved to the forefront.  Further-
more, such actions by the federal government create the possibility
that centralized and concerted efforts to facilitate military voting
may ultimately prove to be the solution to the logistical problems
still affecting the process.  We note, however, that such laws have a
fundamental problem: these efforts to promote military voting still
require the acquiescence and participation of the state and local
governments who run the elections, whose cooperation is not al-
ways forthcoming.  We assert that, while federal statutory schemes
and enforcement are steps in the right direction, they may ulti-
mately be just as “hollow” as previous attempts to facilitate mili-
tary voting because of the need for multiple state and local entities
to change their election laws.  Finally, we argue that technological
solutions, particularly centralized and uniform efforts, are likely
the best means of both ensuring that military voting rights are sub-
stantively upheld while still maintaining the multi-layered election
system based primarily on state law.  The alternative is a complete
federalization of the electoral process, something that Congress has
been historically unwilling to contemplate.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE ISSUE
Estimates indicate that there are between six and seven million
Americans who are overseas, in the Armed Forces, or dependents
of Armed Forces members residing abroad.25  These American citi-
zens include soldiers stationed in places such as Iraq and Afghani-
stan, who are currently fighting the war against terrorism;
missionaries working in remote regions of the world; younger
25. Derek B. Stewart, Dir., Def. Capabilities and Mgmt., Testimony Before Com-
mittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RE-
PORT NO. GAO-06-1134T, ELECTIONS: DOD EXPANDS VOTING ASSISTANCE TO
MILITARY ABSENTEE VOTERS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 1 (2006), available at http:/
/www.gao.gov/new.items/d061134t.pdf.
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Americans studying abroad; and Americans who work overseas,
building economic opportunities in the global economy.26  Each of
these populations present their own challenges for voting officials,
but military voters are often the most difficult to reach because of
the logistical problems associated with sending ballots to mobile
individuals operating in potentially inaccessible and hostile areas.
The U.S. Congress has passed various statutes for decades in an
attempt to facilitate the process for overseas and military voting27
including the Soldier’s Vote Act of 1942,28 the Federal Voting As-
sistance Act of 1955,29 the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of
1975,30 and the currently operating law that superseded them all,
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UO-
CAVA”).31  Such attempts have met with varying levels of success
in making it easier for overseas and military voters to vote in state-
run elections.32
Although a few scholars have argued that military voters have
no problem voting,33 data from numerous studies and analyses con-
ducted since the 2000 election show that civilians living overseas
and personnel in the uniformed services have a difficult time par-
ticipating in the electoral process using the current paper-based ab-
sentee voting system.34  In an examination of absentee voting in
California, researchers found that UOCAVA voters were roughly
26. See, e.g., Americans Abroad: People & Groups, http://www.anamerican
abroad.com/demographics.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
27. See KEVIN J. COLEMAN, THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSEN-
TEE VOTING ACT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT NO.
RS20764 1 (2003, last updated 2006), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/gov
docs/crs//data/2003/upl-meta-crs-4399/RS20764_2003Jan30.pdf?PHPSESSID=98075b5
ea230a9383d3d830cbef0bb98.
28. Id.; see also Soldier’s Vote Act (Armed Forces Absentee Voting Act), ch. 561,
56 Stat. 753 (1942) (repealed 1955).
29. See COLEMAN, supra note 27, at 1; see also Federal Voting Assistance Act of
1955, ch. 656, 69 Stat. 584 (repealed 1986).
30. See COLEMAN, supra note 27, at 1; see also Overseas Citizens Voting Rights
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142 (1976) (repealed 1986).
31. See COLEMAN, supra note 27, at 1; see also Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C., 39 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.).
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, The Bullying of America: A Cautionary Tale About
Military Voting and Civil-Military Relations, 4 ELECTION L.J. 105 (2005) (arguing that
claims of difficulty in military voting were created by the Bush legal team to support
arguments in favor of counting ineligible military ballots).
34. See, e.g., R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall & Betsy Sinclair, Whose Absentee
Votes Are Counted: The Variety and Use of Absentee Ballots in California 1-3 (Caltech/
MIT Voting Technology Project, Working Paper No. 34, 2005), available at http://vote.
caltech.edu/media/documents/wps/vtp_wp34.pdf.
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two times more likely to not return a requested absentee ballot and
approximately three times more likely to have that ballot chal-
lenged when compared to non-UOCAVA voters.35
This problem is not new.  In 1942, 137,686 applications for fed-
eral “war ballots” were received, but only 28,051 of these ballots
were cast in the election.36  Contemporary accounts indicate that
few military personnel voted using conventional state absentee vot-
ing procedures during World War II when personnel were dis-
persed all over the world.37  The low response rate in 1942 was due
to several factors that still present problems today.  The main fac-
tor is simply the speed at which a paper ballot can be created,
mailed to an overseas voter, filled out, and mailed back.38  Such
time scales are not conducive to some states’ regulations about
when voting materials become available, as a result of administra-
tive processes or simply the schedule between primaries and gen-
eral election, or the date by which they must be returned to an
election official to be considered valid.
For example, the deadline for registering as a UOCAVA voter
ranges from thirty days prior to an election in twenty-one states to
absolutely no registration requirement in fifteen states.39  Similarly,
ballots have to be received prior to Election Day in several states,
but can be received even after Election Day in fifteen states.40  This
variation can easily create confusion among overseas and military
voters and impact the very ability of these voters to receive their
ballots in time to return them for tabulation.41  According to the
Department of Defense’s (“DoD”) most recent survey of military
and overseas voters, almost one-third of all military personnel and
twenty percent of non-federally employed overseas civilians that
did not vote in the 2000 election reported that they did not cast
ballots because either they did not receive the ballot they re-
35. See id.
36. Boyd A. Martin, The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944, 39 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 720, 725 (1945).
37. Id. at 725-26.
38. See id. at 726.
39. See David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, in U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-01-704T,
ELECTIONS: ISSUES AFFECTING MILITARY AND OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTERS 10
(2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01704t.pdf (discussing state regis-
tration deadline requirements).
40. See id. (discussing variation among states concerning deadlines for receipt of
overseas ballots and resulting confusion among military voters).
41. Id.
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quested, or they received the ballot too late for it to be returned in
time.42  News coverage noted that soldiers experienced significant
problems in receiving mail in Iraq with some reporting not receiv-
ing mail up to four months after it being sent.43  Such problems are
symptomatic of a long history of balloting difficulties for military
voters, much of which stems from the multi-layered structure of
election law that often results in conflict between state and federal
principles.44
III. CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES: STATE CONTROL VERSUS
THE FEDERAL ROLE
Much of the conflict that arises concerning voting in the military
results from the shared power that the federal and state govern-
ments have over federal elections, which has its roots in the U.S.
Constitution.45  Congress has broad power to regulate federal elec-
tions under the Elections Clause: “The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, ex-
cept as to the Places of chusing Senators.”46  Daniel R. Ortiz and
Pamela S. Karlan note that “the Elections Clause has traditionally
been interpreted [by the Supreme Court] to give Congress virtually
plenary power over a wide range of aspects relating to congres-
sional elections.”47  As early as 1879, the Supreme Court evaluated
the power of Congress to enact legislation, in that case “The En-
forcement Act” of 1870, which sought to ensure citizens had the
ability to vote in federal elections conducted by states “without
42. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., VOTING OVER THE
INTERNET PILOT PROJECT ASSESSMENT REPORT 4-12 to 4-13 (2001), available at http:/
/www.fvap.gov/services/voireport.pdf.
43. Karen Jowers, Troops Want to Know: Where’s My %&#@ Mail?!, ARMY
TIMES, May 10, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-
ARMYPAPER-2872628.php.
44. See infra Part III.
45. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-01-470, ELECTIONS:
THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 1-2
(Mar. 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01470.pdf.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
47. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Congressional Authority to Regulate Elec-
tions, in THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF ELECTIONS: BACKGROUND REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, in TO ASSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: TASK FORCE REPORTS TO ACCOMPANY
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION REFORM pt. X. 14, 14
(2001), available at http://www.tcf.org/publications/electionreform/full_tf_report.pdf.
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molestation.”48  An argument arose whether Congress could pro-
vide piecemeal changes to only some of the aspects of the state-run
system or, should Congress want to have any effect at all, whether
it needed to completely preempt state law and assume full control
over the entire election process for federal offices.49  The Court re-
jected this argument and established, pursuant to the Elections
Clause, that:
[Congress] may either make the regulations, or it may alter
them.  If it only alters, leaving, as manifest convenience re-
quires, the general organization of the polls to the State, there
results a necessary co-operation of the two governments in regu-
lating the subject.  But no repugnance in the system of regula-
tions can arise thence; for the power of Congress over the
subject is paramount.  It may be exercised as and when Con-
gress sees fit to exercise it.  When exercised, the action of Con-
gress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the regulations of
the State, necessarily supersedes them.50
Thus, Congress may enact regulations and inject federal law into
whatever limited aspects of state election procedures it deems nec-
essary.  This Congressional discretion clearly leaves open the door
for more regulation of the conduct of federal elections and, in fact,
would allow Congress to completely federalize such elections and
override the patchwork of local election laws throughout the coun-
try if it desired to create true uniform standards and procedures for
military and other overseas voters.51
Such power has continually been reiterated by the Supreme
Court.  In 1932, the Court again reviewed the Election Clause’s
grant of power to Congress to regulate the time, place, and manner
of federal elections and stated:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words em-
brace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to no-
tices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, du-
ties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of
election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as
to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are neces-
sary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.  And
these requirements would be nugatory if they did not have ap-
48. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 382 (1879).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 383-84.
51. See id.
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propriate sanctions in the definition of offenses and punish-
ments.  All this is comprised in the subject of “times, places and
manner of holding elections.”52
Such power includes the authority to regulate congressional pri-
mary elections, as they are a “necessary step” in choosing federal
officeholders.53  As recently as 1997, the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed congressional supremacy in overriding state election proce-
dures as they apply to federal elections.54  One key characteristic of
all of these cases is that Congress has not yet exercised its plenary
power to completely dictate how federal elections take place, but
has instead provided incremental and targeted regulation to ad-
dress specific perceived problems with state-run elections.  Con-
gress’ exercise of such power to centralize and unify the laws and
procedures relevant to voting in federal elections would certainly
be one means by which military voting could be facilitated to a
greater degree than the patchwork of state laws currently in place,
by either mandating time frames for sending and receiving ballots
or enacting compulsory technological solutions that obviate the
ballot transit issue.
One aspect of elections that Congress cannot regulate at all is
who is eligible to vote in federal elections.  The right to determine
who is eligible to vote in federal elections is granted to the states
under Article I, Section 2 and the Seventeenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.55  Each states that “the [e]lectors in each [s]tate
shall have the [q]ualifications requisite for [e]lectors of the most
numerous [b]ranch of the [s]tate [l]egislature.”56  The Constitution
52. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (finding that Congress may delegate
to the states the process of drawing districts for its members).
53. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (finding that Congress’
power to ensure the integrity of Congressional elections extends to state primary
elections).
54. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 74 (1997) (invalidating Louisiana’s “open pri-
mary” held in October as a violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 7, and setting a uniform day
for electing Senators and Representatives); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT NO. GAO-01-470, supra note 45, at 5-7 (discussing recent cases upholding
Congressional authority to determine registration procedures under the National
Voter Registration Act of 1993).
55. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-01-470, supra note
45, at 21 n.1 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)); see also
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966) (stating that while “[u]nder the distri-
bution of powers effected by the Constitution, the States establish qualifications for
voting for state officers, and the qualifications established by the States for voting for
members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature also determine who
may vote for United States Representatives and Senators,” such qualification could
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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charges the states, not the federal government, with setting voter
eligibility requirements for federal elections, including the voting
eligibility for military personnel.57  Prior to universal military suf-
frage in 1971,58 states and localities were reticent to allow military
voters—especially military voters stationed overseas—to partici-
pate in elections because of the enfranchisement issues it raised.59
Two examples illustrate this point.  First, until the mid-1800s, sev-
eral states only allowed property owners to vote, thus disen-
franchising landless individuals serving in the military;60 second,
although African-Americans were able to serve in the military and
were often forced to serve through the compulsory draft, they were
denied voting rights by states that had Jim Crow laws and all-white
primary elections.61  In both cases, individuals served their nation,
often by force, yet state laws governing elections prevented their
participation in the electoral process.  Only through constitutional
amendment has state discrimination against black voters, female
voters, poor voters, and individuals aged eighteen through twenty
ended.62  These four amendments have, over time, simplified the
process of addressing the problems associated with voting by mili-
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
58. The term “universal suffrage” refers to the full population having the right to
exercise citizenship through voting. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 78,
89-90 (1998) (discussing early use of the term that excluded women and minorities, as
well as stating that granting a universal right to vote is a precondition for democracy).
In the context of the military, “universal suffrage” would be defined as the expansion
of the right to vote to all Americans serving in the military: all races, both genders,
and those over the age of eighteen.
59. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 246-47 (2000) (discussing use of the poll tax
and other means to disenfranchise black voters in the South, including those serving
in the military).
60. See id. at 29.
61. See id. at 246-49.
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (“The
right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for
President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Sena-
tor or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.”).  Obviously, the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment did
not stop racial discrimination.  It was not until the passage of the Voting Rights Act in
1965 that states were forced to end most forms of legal discrimination against African-
Americans and other minority voters. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings,
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tary personnel, as allowing military members to vote no longer sets
a bad precedent by enfranchising those ‘unwanted’ classes of voters
who happen to be serving in the military.63
The combination of Congress’ incremental exercise of its regula-
tory authority over federal elections and the interplay between fed-
eral and state control over elections, often rooted in attempted
disenfranchisement, resulted in very slow progress in the expansion
of both the right and ability of military voters to cast ballots in
federal elections.64  Often wars or other major military mobiliza-
tions drove the improvements that ultimately occurred in both the
enfranchisement and procedural aspects of military voting.65
IV: A HISTORY OF MILITARY VOTING
A. Starting at the Beginning: The Revolutionary War
Before there was even a United States or a Constitution, there
was a war and debate over whether individuals who had fought
that war should be eligible to vote, despite legal barriers to their
participation in the political process.66  Many observed at the time
that to deny men who had fought for their country’s cause the right
to vote was a significant injustice, and “‘every man in the country
who manifests a disposition to venture his all for the defense of its
liberty, should have a voice in its council.’”67  During the Revolu-
tionary War, state militia associations, which were typically com-
prised of working class individuals, agitated for the abolition of
certain restrictions on suffrage such as property or landholding re-
quirements.68  In many states, including Georgia, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Vermont, and Pennsylvania, the
franchise was expanded to include many more working class indi-
viduals.69  Many other states did not change their laws governing
the franchise during the war, even though this created a situation
Congressional Powers, and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 99
(2007).
63. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 268-84 (discussing breakdown of bar-
riers to voting including elimination of the poll tax, literacy tests, and loosening of
residency requirements).
64. See infra Part IV.
65. See infra Part IV.
66. KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 8-14 (discussing the Revolutionary War era’s de-
bate over the conception of voting as a “natural right”).
67. Id. at 14 (quoting a Philadelphia pamphleteer believed to be Thomas Young).
68. See id. at 13-15.
69. Id. at 16-18 (noting the reduction in freehold requirements for voting in these
states and the complete separation of voting from financial circumstances in
Vermont).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ303.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-SEP-07 10:57
2007] MILITARY VOTING AND THE LAW 947
where many of the men who served in the state’s militia during the
war were unable to participate in the political process within their
state or benefit politically from the freedoms for which they were
fighting.70  Thus, the key issue related to voting in the Revolution-
ary War and its immediate aftermath was not how individuals
voted—the methods or procedures used—but rather who could
vote.71
Over the next eighty years, the rights of military voters were a
relatively low priority in many states,72 although there was further
incremental expansion of the franchise.  Between the Revolution-
ary War and the Civil War, the United States engaged in only two
major conflicts—the War of 1812 and the Mexican American
War—and many smaller military actions such as fighting the Bar-
bary pirates.73  The War of 1812 once again raised the issue of mili-
tary voting in the context of “fairness” and led to a further
extension of the franchise through the relaxation of property own-
ership requirements.74  But significant change in military voting
would not occur until the Civil War, as the nation would undergo
the largest military mobilization in its history, where half of all
Northern men of military age and nearly seventy-five percent of all
Southern white men were serving in the army or navy.75  With this
large a percentage of the population serving in the military, pres-
sures to improve voting rights for military personnel were bound to
come to the forefront.76
B. The Civil War and the 1864 Presidential Election
Although it is now taken for granted, the election of 1864 was an
amazing phenomenon.  No nation had ever held a general election
70. Id. at 18 (stating that Rhode Island, Delaware, Connecticut, South Carolina,
and Virginia generally retained their pre-colonial voting requirements, but noting that
Massachusetts actually stiffened the requirements).
71. Id. at 8-18.
72. See William M. Burcher, A History of Soldier Voting in the State of New York,
25 N.Y. HIST. 459, 460 (1944) (noting that there was no agitation for absentee soldier
voting between 1777 and 1863).
73. A complete history of these smaller wars can be found in MAX BOOT, The
SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER 3-30
(2002).
74. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 37-38 (noting that between 1817 and 1820 Con-
necticut, New York, and Mississippi removed the property or taxpaying requirements
for voting for those serving in the state militia).
75. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
STRUCTION 202 (3d ed. 2001).
76. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 87.
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in the middle of a war, much less a Civil War.77  There had never
been a similar situation where there was, in essence, a referendum
on an ongoing war where all citizens, including those doing the
fighting, could participate.78  Two critical questions arose in this
first effort to enfranchise military personnel to vote in the election.
First, by what procedures could Union soldiers participate in the
1864 election?  Second, would the military vote have any direct im-
pact on the outcome of the 1864 election?
Laws governing the participation of military voters varied from
state to state, but in nineteen Northern states, military men could
vote using absentee procedures, creating one of the first instances
of remote voting in America.79  Several Northern states, including
Indiana, did not allow absentee voting, in part because such laws
had been blocked by Democrats who feared the soldier vote.80  To
accommodate these military voters, President Abraham Lincoln
exercised his power as commander-in-chief and called for a cessa-
tion of military operations prior to the election to allow military
personnel from affected states to go home and vote.81  As a result,
Democrats charged that many of the voters who came home to
Indiana to cast their ballots were actually residents of other states,
although there were also documented cases of fraud, such as two
Democratic commissioners from New York in charge of collecting
soldier votes convicted for stuffing the ballot box.82
The 1864 election centered around one issue: war and peace.83
Democrats, led by former Union General George B. McClellan,
were seen as the party of peace (although the question of whether
peace could come only if the South recognized the Union divided
Democrats throughout the election campaign).84  By contrast, Lin-
coln’s position was clear: the war would continue until the South
capitulated.85  Because the 1864 election took place after a string of
decisive military victories by Union forces, including the destruc-
77. See MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 492.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 493.
82. Id.; see also Oscar Osburn Winther, The Soldier Vote in the Election of 1864, 25
N.Y. HIST. 440, 449-53 (1944) (discussing in detail the trial and conviction of the
agents involved in the New York voting scandal, Moses J. Ferry and Edward Dona-
hue, Jr., and the alleged voter fraud in Indiana).
83. See generally MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 471-76, 492-94; Winther, supra
note 82, at 448-49.
84. MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 475-76.
85. Id. at 473.
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tion of Atlanta, many in the military viewed the Democrats’ posi-
tion of seeking peace without conditions as being unfaithful to the
troops.86  This characterization was enhanced by Republican ef-
forts to link Northern Democrats with anti-war and anti-Union ac-
tivities.87  Letters from Union soldiers suggested that they thought
a Democratic victory would bring shame and dishonor on soldiers
who had sacrificed for the Union cause.88
Lincoln recognized that the military vote could be critical to his
re-election and maintaining a Republican majority in Congress.89
In the twelve states where civilian and military votes were counted
separately, Lincoln won seventy-eight percent of the military
vote.90  Although military voters were key members of the Lincoln
electoral coalition, there is some controversy regarding their im-
portance.  Some scholars argue that the soldier vote provided the
margin of victory in six states (Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, New
Jersey, New York, and Maryland) and that McClellan would have
won the election but for the soldier vote in these states.91  The data
in Table 1, however, show that the soldier vote enhanced marginal
victories that Lincoln would have achieved with only the civilian
vote.  Nonetheless, the soldier vote was likely critical in congres-
sional races, and it solidified the Republican control of Congress.
In the 1864 House elections, thirty-one seats were won by a margin
smaller than one thousand votes.92  Of these, eight were won by
Democrats, while twenty-three were won by Republicans, part of
an overall forty-two seat pick-up for Republicans.93
86. Id. at 493.
87. Id. at 482.
88. See BRUCE CATTON, A STILLNESS AT APPOMATTOX 323 (Doubleday & Com-
pany, Inc. 1957) (1953); MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 493.
89. See MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 493.
90. Id.
91. SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE: RED RIVER TO APPOMAT-
TOX 625 (1974).
92. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 940-41 (5th ed.
2005).
93. Id. at 940-41, 1635.
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TABLE 1. VOTE MARGINS FOR THE 1864 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION, BY STATE94
Total Vote Military Vote
State Lincoln McClellan Differential Lincoln McClellan Differential
California 62,053 43,837 18,216 2,600 237 2,363
Connecticut 44,673 42,285 2,388
Delaware 8,155 8,767 (612)
Illinois 189,512 158,724 30,788
Indiana 149,887 130,230 19,657
Iowa 83,858 49,089 34,769 15,178 1,364 13,814
Kansas 17,089 3,836 13,253 2,867 543 2,324
Kentucky 27,787 64,301 (36,514) 1,194 2,823 (1,629)
Maine 67,805 46,992 20,813 4,174 741 3,433
Maryland 40,153 32,739 7,414 2,800 321 2,479
Massachusetts 126,742 48,745 77,997
Michigan 91,133 74,146 16,987 9,402 2,959 6,443
Minnesota 25,031 17,376 7,655
Missouri 72,750 31,596 41,154
Nevada 9,826 6,594 3,232
New Hampshire 36,596 33,034 3,562 2,066 690 1,376
New Jersey 60,724 68,020 (7,296)
New York‡ 368,735 361,986 6,749 209 96 113
Ohio 265,674 205,609 60,065 41,146 9,757 31,389
Oregon 9,888 8,457 1,431
Pennsylvania 296,292 277,443 18,849 26,712 12,349 14,363
Rhode Island‡ 14,349 8,718 5,631 162 28 134
Vermont 42,419 13,321 29,098 243 49 194
West Virginia‡ 23,799 11,078 12,721 76 6 70
Wisconsin 83,458 65,884 17,574 11,372 2,458 8,914
‡ =  Vote totals are for the Army of the Potomac only.
The 1864 election featured new legal mechanisms—remote and
absentee voting—that allowed military personnel serving away
from home to participate in the electoral process.95  For example,
election officials from a state traveled to the units in the field, set
up a polling place, and collected ballots from the soldiers.96  These
procedures enfranchised hundreds of thousands of men serving
94. Adapted from Winther, supra note 82, at 455-57.
95. See Winther, supra note 82, at 441-48 (discussing the implementation of new
procedures in numerous Northern states to accommodate and facilitate soldier
voting).
96. See, e.g., id. at 454 (discussing the process of “camp elections”).
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their country and also had a major impact in the outcome of a fed-
eral election that influenced the prosecution of an ongoing conflict
in which they were engaged as combatants.97  This case illustrates
how concentrated efforts and well-designed voting processes and
procedures can improve the enfranchisement rate of military vot-
ers as well as affect who represents the people in government.
C. From a Civil War to a World War
After the Civil War, the election landscape in the states changed
in several ways.  First, to combat actual or perceived election fraud,
many states adopted voter registration laws that were intentionally
quite restrictive.98  Individuals had to register to vote before going
to the polls on Election Day; in some cases, individuals had to re-
register in person before each general election.99  Not surprisingly,
these restrictions were quite burdensome to many voters, including
soldiers not at home, and they led to a significant decrease in vot-
ing.100  Second, the Civil War served as the impetus for more states
to adopt absentee voting laws.101  Prior to 1861, Oregon was the
only state that allowed men who were away from home on Election
Day to cast their ballots from a remote location.102  As Alexander
Keyssar notes, “the Civil War—and the desire to permit soldiers to
vote during the war—severed the link between voting and physical
presence in a community.”103  Still, many absentee voting laws ben-
efited only citizens within the state on Election Day.  For example,
in 1913, Missouri and North Dakota allowed “voters who are ab-
sent from their regular election districts on the day of an election
to send home their ballots by mail from any point within their re-
spective States.”104  Only eight states extended absentee voting
rights to primary elections, and Minnesota explicitly precluded ab-
97. See MCPHERSON, supra note 75, at 492-93.
98. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 128-29 (discussing tightening of voting require-
ments post-Civil War including literacy tests, property restrictions, and the creation of
“complex, cumbersome registration procedures”); id. at 152-53 (discussing changes to
registration procedures among the states between 1870 and World War I).
99. See id. at 152-54 (discussing the New Jersey requirement to re-register each
election year and the Illinois requirement that voters appear before an election judge
on the Tuesday three or four weeks prior to each election).
100. See id. at 158.
101. See id. at 150.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. P. Orman Ray, Absent Voters, 8 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 442, 442 (1914) (emphasis
added).
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sentee voting in primaries.105  By 1918, only eighteen states had
adopted laws designed explicitly to enfranchise soldiers whose mili-
tary service prevented them from voting in their home precinct.106
Twenty-six states had absentee voting laws that would cover mili-
tary personnel, although this coverage was not always explicit.107
These new absentee voting laws were not intended for soldiers
stationed overseas.108  As burdensome as voting was for many men
who fought in the Civil War, the difficulties faced in 1864 were sim-
ple compared to those encountered by the soldiers voting in the
congressional elections of 1918, when approximately two million
soldiers were stationed overseas.109  Not all of these men were eli-
gible to vote, as some were under the age of twenty-one, but the
obstacles to overcome for those who did want to vote were
daunting.110
Consider the impossibilities of the absentee voting law in Mis-
souri. There, a military absentee voter was required to request an
absentee ballot in person or by mail not less than five days or more
than fifteen days before the election.111  Assuming that a request
for such a ballot arrived at a registrar’s office exactly fifteen days
before the election and was promptly processed; a soldier stationed
in France would have only two weeks for the requested ballot to be
mailed to him overseas, for him to mark the ballot, and for the
ballot to be returned.  Considering that the first non-stop trans-
Atlantic airplane flight did not occur until 1919, the odds were long
that a ballot could get from St. Louis to France and back in two
weeks.112
105. P. Orman Ray, Absent-voting Laws, 1917, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252-53
(1918) [hereinafter Ray, Absent-voting Laws].
106. P. Orman Ray, Military Absent-Voting Laws, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461, 461
(1918) [hereinafter Ray, Military Absent-Voting Laws].
107. See id.; see also generally Ray, Absent-voting Laws, supra note 105 (discussing
explicit statutes regarding military voting and the “North Dakota” style of absentee
voting law that enfranchised soldiers without explicit mention of them).
108. See Ray, Military Absent-Voting Laws, supra note 106, at 463 (detailing voting
requirements with which it would be essentially impossible for soldiers overseas to
comply); see also Martin, supra note 36, at 722 (noting that the military actively pre-
vented states from collecting votes from soldiers on foreign soil claiming it would
disrupt the war effort).
109. Martin, supra note 36, at 723-24.
110. See id.
111. See Ray, Military Absent-Voting Laws, supra note 106, at 463.
112. See William Warntz, Transatlantic Flights and Pressure Patterns, 51 GEO-
GRAPHICAL REV. 187, 195 (1961) (discussing first non-stop flight across the Atlantic
by Alcock and Brown).
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Thus, in World War I, state election laws and federal governance
issues effectively disenfranchised military personnel serving over-
seas.113  The governance issues were highlighted by the War De-
partment’s decision that men stationed overseas would not be able
to participate in the 1918 election.114  Additionally, two pieces of
federal legislation that would have facilitated military voting in
1918 were not acted upon.115  One bill would have created a Fed-
eral Election Commission to oversee voting by military personnel,
and a second would have made it easier for military voters to vote
for federal offices.116  The Department of War initially refused to
supervise voting in congressional elections by soldiers serving over-
seas but suggested that states would be able to conduct elections in
order to enfranchise soldiers from their respective states.117  The
Department of War later decided that “the soldier vote could not
be taken in France or on other foreign soil in the theater of war
without serious interference with military efficiency.”118  For those
soldiers away from home but still on U.S. soil, the option of voting
via absentee ballot existed but it is not known what percentage of
these servicemen voted.119  The millions of soldiers deployed in the
European theatre in 1918, however, likely found it difficult, if not
impossible, to vote.120  Importantly, military votes—or the lack
thereof—may have affected control of Congress; twenty-four
House seats in 1918 were decided by fewer than 1000 votes and
control of Congress switched from the Democrats to the
Republicans.121
D. Voting in a True World War
In World War I, the country participated in a war in Europe that
lasted less than three years and resulted in U.S. forces serving away
from home during only one mid-term election.  Between the two
World Wars, the United States had no sizable force stationed over-
seas to be affected by the absentee voting procedures in the states.
As a result, a “period of stasis” ensued, and the states took little
113. See Martin, supra note 36, at 723.
114. Id. at 722.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 723.
120. Id. at 723-24.
121. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 92,
at 1061-65, 1635.
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action to improve absentee military voting laws.122  The lengthy
U.S. involvement in World War II, however, created pressure for
the military to facilitate the soldier vote and counter-pressure to
ensure that military men did not get ballots.123  The conflict be-
tween those who wanted to facilitate the military vote and those
who wanted to prevent it illustrates the problems that vexed mili-
tary voting prior to the granting of universal suffrage in 1971.
The problem of facilitating military suffrage in World War II was
daunting.  By 1942, several million American soldiers were sta-
tioned away from home throughout North America, Europe, Af-
rica, Asia, and the Pacific.124  Soldiers did not serve in units or
battalions based on their place of origin, unlike during the Civil
War, making it extremely difficult for states to send out election
materials.125  One battalion in Italy, for example, was comprised of
men from thirty-nine different states.126  Most states also retained
the stringent voter registration requirements that were adopted
during the progressive era.  Military personnel were still expected
to register to vote—often in person—and to maintain their regis-
tration—often through annual renewals—while serving overseas or
otherwise away from home.127  Most states failed to differentiate
among those absentee voters serving overseas, those serving in the
continental United States, and civilians on the home front serving
the nation in other ways.128  Likewise, with the exception of Missis-
sippi and South Carolina, all states that had poll taxes required mil-
itary personnel to pay these taxes before voting.129
The absentee ballot laws in the forty-eight states remained quite
divergent.  In total, thirty-four states had relatively liberal absentee
voting laws and another eleven states had limited absentee voting
laws.130  For instance, some states would not allow military voting
in primary elections or voting for any office except the presi-
dency.131  Other states had liberal absentee voting rules for soldiers
122. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 230.
123. See Martin, supra note 36, at 724 (noting pressure groups, congressional hear-
ings, and public demand for service voting).
124. See id. (stating that by 1942 service members were “spread to the four corners
of the earth” and the “problem of placing a ballot in the hands of every qualified
elector in the service seemed astronomical”).
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See KEYSSAR, supra note 59, at 151-59.
128. Martin, supra note 36, at 731.
129. Id. at 725.
130. See id. at 724.
131. Id.
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casting a ballot from within the confines of the state, but not from
an aircraft carrier in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.132  Three
states did not allow absentee voting.133
The implementation of state absentee voting laws for military
voters remained difficult primarily because of ballot transit issues.
In many states, the statutory requirement for the time from when
an absentee ballot would be issued to when it had to be returned
was less than thirty days.134  Even in peacetime this would be a
challenge for a soldier stationed outside the United States; the war
made this challenge more daunting.  Congress attempted to ad-
dress the non-uniformity of state laws prior to the 1942 mid-term
election via the Soldier’s Vote Act by requiring states to create a
federal ballot that allowed soldiers to vote for the four major fed-
eral offices—a President, Vice-President, Senator, and Representa-
tive; states could also choose to add state or local races.135  The
Department of War provided soldiers with a post card which, if
sent to their state’s Secretary of State, would result in receipt of a
federal ballot.136  The Department of War would then facilitate get-
ting the ballot back to the appropriate Secretary of State to be
counted.137
One interesting feature of the 1942 law is that it had a mecha-
nism for each Secretary of State to submit to the Treasury Depart-
ment an estimate of the costs associated with implementation of
this Act.138  The Treasury would reimburse the state for the costs
incurred, including “the expense of preparing and printing post
cards, official war ballots, booklets, envelopes, instructions, and
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Am. Political Sci. Ass’n, Findings and Recommendations of the Special
Committee on Service Voting, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 512, 515 (1952) (republishing
portions of H.R. Doc. No. 82-407 (1952)) [hereinafter APSA, Recommendations]; see
also Martin, supra note 36, at 724.
135. See Martin, supra note 36, at 725 (describing terms of Soldier’s Vote Act); see
also Soldier’s Vote Act (Armed Forces Absentee Voting Act), ch. 561, 56 Stat. 753
(1942) (repealed 1955) (stating it was “[a]n act to provide for a method of voting, in
time of war, by members of the land and naval forces absent from the place of their
residence”).
136. See Martin, supra note 36, at 725; see also 56 Stat. 753 § 3 (“Every member of
the land or naval forces of the United States absent from the place of his residence
may make request of the secretary of state of the State of his residence for a ballot
suitable for use in voting in accordance with the provisions of this Act.  The Secretary
of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall cause to be printed and distributed to such
members of the land and naval forces an adequate number of post cards which shall
be used by each such member in making such request.”).
137. See Martin, supra note 36, at 725; see also 56 Stat. 753 § 3.
138. See Martin, supra note 36, at 725; see also 56 Stat. 753 § 10.
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other supplies, and the cost of mailing and express charges.”139
This makes the 1942 law one of the first, if not the first, cases where
the federal government subsidized state and local election
administration.
While this law sought to facilitate voting by improving ballot ac-
cessibility, it did not address voter registration and eligibility.
Soldiers still had to follow the state’s registration rules, although
eligible voters could not be subject to poll taxes or similar taxes.140
This Act does not seem to have facilitated many military votes;
fewer than 140,000 federal ballots were requested, and only 28,051
were validly cast.141  A subsequent analysis conducted by the Bu-
reau of the Census found that, among the four reasons for its fail-
ure, the law was enacted too close to the election for states to
implement it effectively.142  Because the law was passed on Sep-
tember sixteenth, its effect on the November election was deemed
to be “nearly worthless.”143
In 1943, members of Congress pressed for more effective legisla-
tion to facilitate military voting in the upcoming 1944 election cy-
cle.144  In part, this was a partisan decision.  Polling done by
George Gallup in 1943 found that the 1944 election was a toss-up
among the general public.145  Sixty-one percent of the military vote
(over six million), however, was predicted to go to President
Roosevelt and the Democrats.146  As was the case in 1864, military
139. See 56 Stat. 753 § 10 (“There are authorized to be appropriated, to be ex-
pended as provided in this section, such amounts as may be necessary to pay the
expenses of carrying out the provisions of this Act, including the expense of preparing
and printing post cards, official war ballots, booklets, envelopes, instructions, and
other supplies, and the cost of mailing and express charges.”).
140. Id. § 2 (“No person in military service in time of war shall be required, as a
condition of voting in any election for President, Vice President, electors for President
or Vice President, or for Senator or Member of the House of Representatives, to pay
any poll tax or other tax or make any other payment to any State or political subdivi-
sion thereof.”).
141. See Martin, supra note 36, at 725-26.  Of course, soldiers could vote using their
state’s traditional absentee voting laws, but these provisions were almost always inad-
equate for addressing the needs of soldiers serving overseas. See id. at 724-25
(describing state absentee procedures and difficulties complying with them by
soldiers).
142. See id. at 726.
143. See COLEMAN, supra note 27, at 2 (quoting THE FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., 11TH REPORT 2 (1977)).
144. See Martin, supra note 36, at 726 (discussing Green-Lucas bill introduced in
1943 to expand military voting).
145. George Gallup, Vote of Soldiers Could Decide ‘44 Election, Gallup Poll Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1943, at 48.
146. Id.
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voters were seen as able to affect the outcome of presidential and
congressional races, and Democratic members wanted to make the
military voting process as simple as possible.  Facing pressure from
the public and soldiers to ensure that military personnel could par-
ticipate in the electoral process, Congress considered two ap-
proaches to facilitate military voting.  One approach—sponsored
by Senators Theodore F. Green (Rhode Island Democrat) and
Scott W. Lucas (Illinois Democrat) and favored by the President
and Northern Democrats—would have created a war ballot that
would be distributed to American troops by a War Ballot Commis-
sion.147  In order to vote, soldiers would only have to fill out the
ballot and it would be returned to the appropriate secretary of
state to be counted.148
This approach was opposed by Republicans, who did not want to
increase the size of the Democratic electorate, and by Southern
Democrats, who did not want federal officials interfering with state
suffrage, especially by potentially enfranchising African-Americans
normally excluded from voting by Jim Crow restrictions.149  The
bill supported by President Roosevelt and Northern Democrats
would have exempted military personnel from poll taxes, one of
the most effective means of disenfranchising African-American
and poor white voters in the South.150  Because the federal govern-
ment cannot set state suffrage requirements, opponents of the
Green-Lucas legislation argued that it was unconstitutional.151  Op-
ponents of Green-Lucas arguing for states’ rights effectively gutted
it through the amendment process.152  This new bill required states
to use the federal ballot only if: (1) a state failed to establish effec-
tive absentee voting procedures, (2) the federal ballot was certified
by the state, and (3) a military voter had not received a requested
traditional absentee ballot.153  The 1944 law liberally used the
147. See Martin, supra note 36, at 726-27.
148. Id.  The war ballot only included federal races.  States had the option of adding
state races to the ballot if they desired. Id. at 725-27.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 727-28.
152. Id. at 729.
153. See id. (noting limitations in amended 1944 Green-Lucas bill, which Congress
passed as Act of April 1, 1944, ch. 150, 58 Stat. 136, 136-40 (repealed 1955)).
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phrase “recommends to the states,”154 as opposed to the word
“shall,” which was used consistently throughout the 1942 law.155
Even with the weaker federal law, the 1944 election saw military
voting that far exceeded the projections of political analysts.  Turn-
out among the general population was sixty percent while fifty per-
cent of military personnel requested ballots and thirty percent
succeeded in casting ballots, even with the associated logistical
problems.156  There are some discrepancies regarding how many
military personnel voted, with the New York Times reporting that
between 3.1 million and 4.4 million soldiers voted in the 1944 elec-
tion,157 and the American Political Science Association (“APSA”)
reporting that 4,487,540 military personnel requested ballots and
2,691,160 submitted ballots that were counted in the totals.158  With
the two presidential candidates only separated by a total of 3.5 mil-
lion votes in the final outcome, military votes were significant in
the final result.  In New Jersey the military vote tipped the state
from Republican Thomas Dewey, who won the civilian vote, to
President Roosevelt, who dominated the military vote.159  The 1944
election also helped the Democratic Party rebound from its mid-
154. See, e.g., 58 Stat. 136, 136-40 § 201 (“The Congress hereby expresses itself as
favoring, and recommends to the several States the immediate enactment of, appro-
priate legislation to enable each person absent from the place of his residence and
serving in the armed forces of the United States” to vote by absentee ballot); id. § 204
(“Such post cards may be used, if State law permits, as applications for ballots under
State absentee balloting laws.”); id. § 207(a) (“It is recommended that the secretary of
state of each of the several States, upon receipt of any such post-card application,
promptly forward it to the proper county, city or other election official.”); id. § 207(d)
(“It is recommended that, in States where the voters’ absentee ballot will not be avail-
able for mailing to the voter forty-five days prior to any primary, general or special
election, such States cause to be made such changes in the election laws of their States
as will lengthen such time.”).
155. See, e.g., Soldier’s Vote Act (Armed Forces Absentee Voting Act), ch. 561, 56
Stat. 753 § 2 (1942) (repealed 1955) (“No person in military service in time of war
shall be required, as a condition of voting in any election . . . to pay any poll tax or
other tax.”); id. § 4(a) (“Each secretary of state, upon receipt of postcards prepared
pursuant to section 3, shall, from time to time, prepare for, and cause to be transmit-
ted to each canvassing board . . . a statement containing the names and addresses of,
and such other information appearing on the postcard as may be appropriate.”); id.
§ 5 (“The secretary of state of each State shall cause to be prepared and printed, for
use in voting under this Act, an appropriate number of official war ballots.”).
156. See APSA, Recommendations, supra note 134, at 513.
157. See Martin, supra note 36, at 732 (citing Leo Egan, Service Ballots Put at
4,400,000 in Last Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1944, at 1).
158. See APSA, Recommendations, supra note 134, at 513.
159. Egan, supra note 157, at 48.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ303.txt unknown Seq: 25 20-SEP-07 10:57
2007] MILITARY VOTING AND THE LAW 959
term losses in the 1942 House races; the military vote may have
played a key role in some of these races.160
E. Uniform Voting Laws for Uniformed Voters
After World War II ended, pressure remained to create a perma-
nent uniform national voting procedure that would address the
needs of all military personnel overseas.  It was clear that the
United States would remain a world military power with forces sta-
tioned around the globe for extended periods.  President Harry S.
Truman saw a need to study the military voting issue systemati-
cally, and in 1951 he asked the APSA to establish a commission for
the purpose of making recommendations regarding how to im-
prove voting among military service personnel.161  In 1952, the
APSA’s Special Committee on Service Voting released its find-
ings.162  The report found that because of the lateness of the 1942
law and the voluntary nature and states’ rights framework of the
1944 statute, these laws had either minimal or limited success in
increasing the military vote.163  The threat of a federal ballot had
indeed stimulated some states to improve their absentee ballot
laws.164  Military voting remained infrequent, however, in many
states, especially in the Democratic South, where voting in general
elections at the time was not particularly meaningful.165
The APSA report also found that voting by military personnel
had become harder since 1944, even though Congress had again
passed legislation in 1946 encouraging states to improve their mili-
tary voting laws.166  For example, six states continued to require
registration in person, five states had special absentee ballot appli-
cation procedures (a military voter literally had to apply to apply
for a ballot!), and twenty states had very short windows for re-
160. Id.
161. See APSA, Recommendations, supra note 134, at 512-13.
162. See id. at 513.
163. See id. at 513-14.
164. See id. at 514.
165. In the South, it was the primary election, rather than the general election, that
was important for determining representation. See KEY, supra note 12, at 407 (noting
that the office in the South, during this period, was usually won by the Democratic
candidate by an overwhelming majority and that such candidates therefore often ran
unopposed in the general election).  In the 1944 presidential election, Southern voting
in both the primary and general election was not particularly meaningful, as
Roosevelt won all of the Southern states handily. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S
GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 92, at 704.
166. APSA, Recommendations, supra note 134, at 514-15.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ303.txt unknown Seq: 26 20-SEP-07 10:57
960 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
questing and returning an absentee ballot.167  New Mexico and
South Carolina no longer even had absentee voting procedures,
and Texas did not allow members of the regular armed forces to
vote.168
APSA made a series of recommendations to make voting simple
for military personnel.169  First, it offered ten recommendations to
improve the rights of military voters, including doing away with
poll taxes, literacy tests, and difficult registration and residency re-
quirements.170  APSA recommended that military personnel
should be able to use a federal post card application for a ballot,
receive ballots well before the election, and receive information
about the election and voting procedures.171  Second, APSA rec-
ommended that all states change their election laws to conform to
its ten principles, focusing especially on the poll tax and registra-
tion requirements.172  Third, APSA recommended that the federal
law be changed to ensure that military voting was always pro-
moted, not just during national emergencies.173  Fourth, APSA
called on the Secretary of Defense to collect data and publish re-
ports on military voting and whether states were fulfilling their ob-
ligations to promote it.174  Fifth, it encouraged political parties and
interest groups, such as the League of Women Voters, to promote
military voting and to develop mechanisms to provide election in-
formation to military personnel.175  Finally, APSA encouraged the
creation of a National Bipartisan Commission on Voting to pro-
mote election reform.176
Rather than implement such sweeping changes in the form of
mandatory requirements, Congress passed the 1955 Federal Voting
167. Id. (noting that Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Utah required in-person registration, while Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Montana, and
Utah required an application for an application).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 517-20.
170. Id. at 517.
171. Id.
172. Id. (“By long tradition and accepted practice, the responsibility for election
administration in the Unites States is vested in the State governments.  We believe
they should retain that responsibility and should take steps to exercise it more effec-
tively.  We therefore recommend legislative action in those States where necessary to
bring their voting laws into conformity with the following principles.”).
173. See id. at 518 (recommending removal of the words “in time of war” from each
of the first two sections of 50 U.S.C. §§ 301-02).
174. Id. at 519.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 519-20.
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Assistance Act,177 which implemented many of APSA’s recom-
mendations as voluntary standards and recommendations for ab-
sentee voter registration and voting procedures for the states to
follow in order to facilitate voting by military and civilian support
personnel stationed overseas.178  The 1944 Act was only relevant in
times of war, so the new law benefited the approximately three
million military personnel serving during the Cold War in addition
to civilian support personnel and dependents.179  Likely at the in-
sistence of Southern Senators, however, the states retained the
right to determine who in the military services would and would
not be enfranchised.180  While these limitations hampered the ex-
tension of full voting rights to military personnel, the 1955 Act set
the stage for future federal voting reforms by requiring the Presi-
dent to designate an executive department or agency to “coordi-
nate and facilitate” federal military voting and issue a report every
odd-numbered year on the issues affecting military voters.181  This
Act also required states to furnish requested data to this designee,
and required other federal agencies—especially the Attorney Gen-
eral and the General Services Administration—to cooperate with
the designee in implementing the 1955 Act.182
Although the APSA report came out before the 1952 general
election, its findings would have been little changed if it had been
released a year later.  It was estimated that forty percent of the 2.5
million military personnel were directly disenfranchised because of
complex state absentee voting regulations in place at the time.183
For example, there were approximately 260,000 soldiers stationed
in Korea in 1952, and officers estimated that approximately thirty
percent attempted to vote.184  Trying to vote and actually voting,
however, were two different things as one civilian radio reporter
amply demonstrated.185  Robert Alden received his absentee ballot
177. See Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, ch. 656, 69 Stat. 584 (repealed
1986).
178. Id.
179. Compare Act of Apr. 1, 1944, ch. 150, 58 Stat. 136 § 201 (repealed 1955) (stat-
ing that law is applicable to voting in election “in time of war”), with 69 Stat. 584
(stating that law is applicable “in any primary, special, or general election held in his
election district or precinct”).
180. See 69 Stat. 584 § 101 (stating that provisions apply if a service member “is
otherwise eligible to vote in that election”).
181. Id. § 201.
182. Id. § 103.
183. Robert Alden, Stevenson Leads by 2 to 1 in Poll of 500 U.S. Army Men in
Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1952, at 1.
184. Robert Alden, 30% of Soldiers in Korea Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1952, at 1.
185. Id.
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from New York County on October 31, the same day that ballots
were required to be received by election officials in New York.186
Furthermore, some state absentee voting laws contradicted the
state constitution.  For example, New Jersey law only allowed mili-
tary personnel to vote with an absentee ballot under certain situa-
tions because of a concern for fraud, even though New Jersey’s
1844 Constitution explicitly enfranchised all absentee voters.187
By 1965, Congress had passed laws to end the systematic disen-
franchisement of African-Americans.188  With the franchise broad-
ened, political parties began to engage in more organized efforts to
turn out the military vote, and in the 1960s the issue of military
voting took on a decidedly partisan tone.189  In 1968, the Republi-
can National Committee appointed absentee voting chairmen in
forty-five states and the District of Columbia to register and mobil-
ize the estimated 3.5 million military voters.190  The European Re-
publican Committee encouraged the two million Americans in
Europe to vote by having Shirley Temple Black tour European cit-
ies to encourage Republicans overseas to vote.191  Democrats tried
to mobilize overseas voters in twenty-six countries through “Amer-
icans Abroad for Humphrey-Muskie” committees that ran ads to
encourage Democrats to vote.192
The military itself also sought to assist in the voting process. The
military set up temporary voter information stations in Laos, Thai-
land, and Vietnam in 1968 to inform military voters about each
state’s absentee voting laws.193  The military also encouraged
soldiers to vote through various ads in the Army Reporter, armed
forces radio, and the armed forces television networks.  Addition-
ally, voting assistance officers in the various military branches en-
couraged soldiers to vote and answered questions regarding the
election rules in the states.194  These generic efforts to encourage
186. Id.
187. Douglas Dales, Absentee Rulings to Curtail Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1952,
at 1.
188. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1).
189. See, e.g., Absentee G.I. Votes Sought by Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
1968, at 31.
190. Id.
191. Associated Press, European Branch Is Set up by G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
1968, at 21.
192. Both Parties Woo Absentee Voters, Especially the G.I., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1968, at 28.
193. Douglas Robinson, Armed Forces Press Efforts to Spur Voting From Vietnam,
HOUS. CHRON., June 5, 1968, at A-4.
194. Id.
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voting were supported by both parties.  Not all efforts, however,
were as politically neutral.  In some elections, senior military offi-
cials attempted to indoctrinate soldiers.195  For example, Major
General Edwin A. Walker, who commanded troops in Germany
during the 1960 election, recommended that his soldiers consult the
conservative Americans for Constitutional Action voter guide
before casting a ballot and gave his troops literature from the John
Birch Society.196  It is clear that with the expansion in voting rights
and capabilities, the military became an important constituency
courted by both parties.
The logistics of voting had not become any easier, and the idio-
syncrasies of state election law and ballot transit issues could still
keep overseas citizens and servicemen from being able to vote.
Consider the experience of one Peace Corps volunteer:
The Board of Elections of Suffolk County [New York] must
truly live in an isolated, automated world if they think mail can
travel 14,000 miles by plane from Singapore to Kuching; 150
miles from Kuching to Sibu by plane; sixty miles by Chinese
launch from Sibu to Oya; eight miles by bus from Oya to Mukah
and a half-mile by bicycle from the post office to me (the last 78
1/2 miles taking twice the time of the first 14,000) and be re-
turned in 12 days . . . . The Board of Elections should become
more realistic about world mail systems and stop depriving con-
cerned overseas Americans of their right to vote.197
With almost all Americans eligible to vote, the issue of voting
rights for military personnel and individuals living overseas became
much less controversial and opposition in Congress declined ac-
cordingly.  In 1968, Congress expanded voting rights for civilians
living overseas by passing two laws amending the Federal Voting
Assistance Act that encouraged states to allow U.S. residents living
overseas to be able to register and vote.198  As the legislative his-
tory to Public Law 90-343 notes, “[t]housands of Americans tem-
porarily residing abroad and engaged in business, the professions,
teaching, the arts, and other walks of life, are denied the right to
195. See, e.g., JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE ULTRA-SE-
CRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 66 (2001).
196. Id.
197. Stephanie Miranda, Letter to the Editor, Absentee Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 1968, at E11.
198. See Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-343, 82 Stat. 180 (repealed 1986)
(recommending expanding absentee voting to “all citizens temporarily residing
abroad”); Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-344, 82 Stat. 181 (repealed 1986)
(amending 1955 Act to include those living abroad not affiliated with military).
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vote because their States of residence do not provide for absentee
registration or absentee voting, or both.”199  Due to corporate
globalization and the increase in Americans volunteering to serve
their country overseas in civilian capacities, the issue of disen-
franchisement was becoming more real for more people.  For in-
stance, even individuals serving the government had problems
voting.  The head of the Peace Corps told Congress that “[o]ne of
the major difficulties faced by Peace Corps trainees and volunteers
in voting while away from their residences is in complying with
State laws requiring oaths when applying for an absentee ballot as
well as when marking the ballot.”200  Once again, however, the vol-
untary nature of the 1968 law left overseas voters at the mercy of
their own state’s absentee voting laws.201
In 1975, Congress passed Public Law 94-203, the Overseas Citi-
zens Voting Rights Act, which enfranchised the “1.6 million Amer-
icans, not counting military personnel, living abroad.”202  An
overseas citizen now had the right to vote in the state in which “he
was last domiciled immediately prior to his departure from the
United States and in which he could have met all qualifications to
vote in Federal elections under any present law.”203  This legisla-
tion enfranchised an array of overseas civilians including depen-
dents of military personnel stationed overseas, students and
scholars studying abroad, business people and their families, and
expatriates.204  According to the Association of Americans Resi-
dent Overseas, less than ten percent of overseas Americans were
retired; most were business people and their families.205  These
overseas Americans were now allowed to vote in federal elec-
tions.206  The Act also clarified the varying and confusing state re-
gistration and voting requirements that an individual had to meet
to vote absentee while overseas and, for the first time since the
199. S. REP. NO. 90-1025 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2064, 2065.
200. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1385 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2067, 2071.
201. See § 104, 82 Stat. at 181-82 (stating that Congress is “recommending that each
State” allow such voters to use absentee voting procedures).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 94-649(I), at 110 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2358,
2367.
203. Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142
§ 95(3) (1976) (repealed 1986).
204. See H.R. REP NO. 94-649(I), at 2367 (listing the types of people who would be
enfranchised by the legislation).
205. Id.
206. See 89 Stat. 1142 § 95(3); see also H.R. REP NO. 94-649(I), at 2367-68.
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1942 Act, spoke in mandatory terms directing states to comply.207
The law had finally moved past the issues of enfranchisement and
now sought to resolve the logistical issues and hurdles facing
Americans overseas, both military and non-military, in an effort to
facilitate voting via absentee ballot.  The 1975 Act, however, was
unfortunately not the end of such problems, many of which con-
tinue to this day.
V. CURRENT PROBLEMS
The current federal policy regime for overseas voting was estab-
lished in 1986, when Congress passed the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), which superseded
both the 1955 Federal Voting Assistance Act and the Overseas Cit-
izens Voting Rights Act of 1975.208  This law further eased absentee
voting for both military personnel and American citizens residing
overseas.  It required states to provide for absentee registration
and voting by uniformed services and overseas voters209 and estab-
lished a federal voting assistance program to facilitate absentee re-
gistration and voting by eligible voters.210  It also provided for a
standard Federal Post Card Application (“FPCA”) form that it rec-
ommends states allow for registration and application purposes,
and provides for postage-free mailing of FPCAs and other ballot-
ing materials.211  Additionally, it stipulated that U.S. citizens over-
207. See, e.g., 89 Stat. 1142 § 95(4) (“Each State shall provide by law for the casing
of absentee ballots for Federal elections by all citizens residing outside the United
States who—, (1) are entitled to vote in such State pursuant to section 3; (2) have
registered or otherwise qualified to vote under subsection (a); and (3) have returned
such ballots to the appropriate election official of such State in sufficient time so that
such ballot is received by such election official not later than the time of closing of the
polls in such State on the day of such election.”).
208. See Registration and Voting by Absent Uniformed Services Voters and Over-
seas Voters in Elections for Federal Office, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff to ff-6 (2006).
209. See id. § 1973ff-1(a) (“In general.  Each State shall — (1) permit absent uni-
formed services voters and overseas voters to use absentee registration procedures
and to vote by absentee ballot in general, special, primary, and runoff elections for
Federal office; (2) accept and process, with respect to any election for Federal office,
any otherwise valid voter registration application and absentee ballot application
from an absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter, if the application is re-
ceived by the appropriate State election official not less than 30 days before the
election.”).
210. See id. § 1973ff(b)(5) (stating that the presidential designee shall “compile and
distribute (A) descriptive material on State absentee registration and voting proce-
dures, and (B) to the extent practicable, facts relating to specific elections, including
dates, offices involved, and the text of ballot questions”).
211. See id. § 1973ff(b)(2) (stating that the Presidential designee shall “prescribe an
official post card form, containing both an absentee voter registration application and
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seas may continue to vote for federal office even if they have no
current address in the United States.212  Properly registered mili-
tary and overseas voters are also allowed to submit a federal write-
in absentee ballot for federal offices in a general election if they
did not receive in a timely manner the state absentee ballot they
requested.213  According to the U.S. General Accountability Office
(“GAO”), “[t]he act covers approximately 6.1 million [American]
citizens, including 2.7 million military members and their
dependents.”214
As with previous military voting laws, some discretion is still left
to the states under UOCAVA, and variations in registration re-
quirements, deadlines for submitting ballots, and tight time frames
between when ballots are sent to military voters and when they are
due to be returned still cause problems.215  These problems were
illustrated by the 2000 election.216  In Florida, issues such as ballot
transit times continued to disenfranchise voters.  For instance, the
New York Times conducted an independent examination of late
overseas absentee ballots received in the 2000 Florida election.217
These late ballots were received after November 7, 2000, but were
ultimately examined by canvassing boards between November 17,
2000 and November 26, 2000.218  The researchers examined 3,704
of these overseas ballots received after November 7, of which 2,504
were accepted and counted by canvassing boards.219  Thus, nearly
an absentee ballot application, for use by the States as required under section 1973ff-
1(4) of this title”).
212. See id. § 1973ff-6(5)(B) (defining an “overseas voter” as “a person who resides
outside the United States and is qualified to vote in the last place in which the person
was domiciled before leaving the United States”).
213. See id. § 1973ff-2(a) (“The Presidential designee shall prescribe a Federal
write-in absentee ballot (including a secrecy envelope and mailing envelope for such
ballot) for use in general elections for Federal office by absent uniformed services
voters and overseas voters who make timely application for, and do not receive,
States, absentee ballots.”); see also COLEMAN, supra note 27, at 2-3 (describing proce-
dures in UOCAVA).
214. See Walker, supra note 39, at 1.
215. See id. at 11 (noting the variation in state election procedures, including some
states requiring receipt of voted ballot the day before the election, while some accept
them up to fifteen days after the election).
216. For further discussion of the Florida 2000 court cases, see infra notes 249-56
and accompanying text.
217. See Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 5 (noting the “late overseas absentee
ballots: Bush: 1,575; Gore: 836, Leader and margin (pct. of all votes): Bush by 739”).
218. Id.; see also generally Imai & King, supra note 5.
219. See Barstow & Van Natta, supra note 5 (stating that 680 late overseas absentee
ballots with flaws were accepted and 1,824 late overseas absentee ballots without
flaws were accepted).
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33% of these overseas ballots received after November 7, 2000
were invalidated for various reasons.220  The researchers then ex-
amined the 2,504 overseas absentee ballots that were accepted by
the canvassing boards and included in county tabulations.221  Based
on the Florida regulations for what constitutes an acceptable over-
seas absentee ballot, 680 (27%) of the accepted late ballots were
legally flawed.222  If these 680 ballots had not been accepted and
counted (as they would not have been under the strict application
of Florida law), a full 51% of the late overseas absentee ballots
would have been rejected in the 2000 Florida election.223  The only
reason late ballots were counted at all was because, as discussed in
greater detail below, there had been a previous problem with over-
seas voting in Florida resulting from the tight time frame between
sending out ballots and the deadline for their return.224  This failure
of UOCAVA to directly address such issues with solutions, such as
mandatory lead-times that are sufficient for sending out ballots or
expanded deadlines for their receipt, leads to state-level difficulties
resulting from incompatible state election procedures and
regulations.225
The passage of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”)226
and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002227
made six major changes to the UOCAVA process in an effort to
improve the ability of these voters to vote.  First, states are re-
quired to designate a single state office to serve UOCAVA voters
in the registration and ballot application process.228  Second, states
220. Id.
221. See id. (stating that 680 late overseas absentee ballots with flaws were accepted
and 1,824 late overseas absentee ballots without flaws were accepted).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See infra notes 249-60 and accompanying text (discussing legal cases concern-
ing Florida ballot counting).
225. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of
relatively ad hoc tabulation procedures during the Florida 2000 presidential election
recount).
226. Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
227. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107,
115 Stat. 1012 (2001).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(b)(1) (2006) (“Each State shall designate a single of-
fice which shall be responsible for providing information regarding voter registration
procedures and absentee ballot procedures to be used by absent uniformed services
voters and overseas voters with respect to elections for Federal office (including pro-
cedures relating to the use of the Federal write-in absentee ballot) to all absent uni-
formed services voters and overseas voters who wish to register to vote or vote in any
jurisdiction in the State.”).
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must collect and publish statistics on UOCAVA registration and
balloting.229  Third, a single absentee ballot request is now valid for
two federal elections.230  Fourth, there is a standard oath for all
voting documents promulgated by the Federal Voting Assistance
Program (“FVAP”), which oversees UOCAVA voting.231  Fifth,
states must accept all absentee ballot requests, even if they are re-
ceived before the state typically accepts them.232  Finally, states
must notify UOCAVA voters if their registration application is
rejected.233
Nevertheless, it is clear that UOCAVA voters still face serious
problems in voting because of logistical difficulties and variation
among state laws.  In 2001, the GAO found the UOCAVA voting
process very cumbersome, resulting in the disenfranchisement of
229. See id. § 1973ff-1(c) (“Not later than 90 days after the date of each regularly
scheduled general election for Federal office, each State and unit of local government
which administered the election shall (through the State, in the case of a unit of local
government) submit a report to the Election Assistance Commission (established
under the Help America Vote Act of 2002) on the combined number of absentee
ballots transmitted to absent uniformed services voters and overseas voters for the
election and the combined number of such ballots which were returned by such voters
and cast in the election, and shall make such report available to the general public.”).
230. See Pub. L. No. 107-107 § 1606(b) (“If a State accepts and processes an official
post card form (prescribed under section 101) submitted by an absent uniformed ser-
vices voter or overseas voter for simultaneous voter registration and absentee ballot
application (in accordance with section 102(a)(4)) and the voter requests that the ap-
plication be considered an application for an absentee ballot for each subsequent
election for Federal office held in the State during that year, the State shall provide an
absentee ballot to the voter for each subsequent election for Federal office held in the
State during that year.”); see also Pub. L. No. 107-252 § 704 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-3(a)) (striking “during that year” from the National Defense Au-
thorization Act (“NDAA”) amendment and replacing it with “through the next 2
regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office (including any runoff elections
which may occur as a result of the outcome of such general elections), the State shall
provide an absentee ballot to the voter for each such subsequent election”).
231. See Pub. L. No. 107-252 § 705 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-
1(a)(5)) (stating that “if the State requires an oath or affirmation to accompany any
document under this title, use the standard oath prescribed by the Presidential
designee”).
232. See id. § 706 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-3(e)) (“A State may
not refuse to accept or process, with respect to any election for Federal office, any
otherwise valid voter registration application or absentee ballot application (including
the postcard form prescribed under section 1973ff of this title) submitted by an absent
uniformed services voter during a year on the grounds that the voter submitted the
application before the first date on which the State otherwise accepts or processes
such applications for that year submitted by absentee voters who are not members of
the uniformed services.”).
233. See id. § 706 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1973ff-1(d)) (“With respect to
each absent uniformed services voter and each overseas voter who submits a voter
registration application or an absentee ballot request, if the State rejects the applica-
tion or request, the State shall provide the voter with the reasons for the rejection.”).
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many voters.234  The paper-based process is also a source of many
problems.  As the GAO noted,
[M]ilitary and overseas voters do not always complete absentee
voting requirements or use federal forms correctly.  The basic
steps that absentee voters must take to register and request an
absentee ballot are similar for all states.  Nevertheless, absentee
voting schedules and requirements vary from state to state . . . .
County officials said that problems in processing absentee vot-
ing applications arise primarily because voters do not fill in the
forms correctly or do not begin the voting process early enough
to complete the multiple steps they must take.235
Ballot transit times are another important potential problem.  In
its study of UOCAVA voting, the GAO also found that transit
times for first class mail can range from as little as five days to as
much as a month.236  A survey by the GAO found that almost two-
thirds of all disqualified absentee ballots were rejected because
election officials received them after the official deadline.237  The
report also noted that there are special types of mail transit, such as
transit to naval vessels underway, that are difficult to service.238
For example, mail transit averages seven days for eighty percent of
mail.239  Remote areas and forward deployed locations, however,
such as Bosnia or Kosovo, may take an average of nine days.240  In
the legislative history for the UOCAVA law, Congress documents
these and other problems.241
234. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-01-1026,
ELECTIONS: VOTING ASSISTANCE TO MILITARY AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS SHOULD
BE IMPROVED (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011026.pdf; see also
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. D-2003-072, DOD COMPLI-
ANCE WITH THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT ii
(2003), available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy03/03-072.pdf (finding that
voter assistance programs were “partially effective” in six of ten locations inspected
and “ineffective” in four).
235. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-01-1026, supra note
234, at 40-41.
236. Id. at 73.
237. Id. at 6-7.
238. Id. at 48 (describing difficulties encountered when using mail transit to trans-
port absentee votes).
239. See id. at 72 (stating that the Department of Defense’s standard for mail deliv-
ery is a transit time of seven days for eighty percent of first class letter mail).
240. Id.
241. See HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY, THE FED. SOC’Y FOR LAW AND PUB. POLICY
STUDIES, VOTING BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS: THE UNI-
FORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT 5 (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.fec.gov/members/von_Spakovsky/vonSpakovsky_articles.shtml (follow pdf
hyperlink for “Voting by Military Personnel and Overseas Citizens: the Uniformed and
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More recently, a 2004 GAO study found that ballot transit times
to Iraq fell within the Army standard of twelve to eighteen days for
prograde mail (mail sent from the United States into Iraq) for
every month between February, 2003 and September, 2003, but
that this “standard” hid the fact that twenty-five percent of test
letters were delivered more than eighteen days after the date
mailed.242  Moreover, the delivery time for retrograde mail (mail
from Iraq to the United States) was outside the twelve to eighteen
day delivery standard for two of the six months of the evalua-
tion.243  Thus, under most circumstances it was difficult, if not im-
possible in many cases, for mail to be sent and returned from Iraq
in less than thirty days, a typical deadline lead-time for absentee
ballots to be sent to prospective voters.  At best, it provided only a
very short window for personnel to individually receive their mail,
properly fill out the documentation, and then be in a position to
place it in return mail.  Congress, in its examination of the issue
during the UOCAVA debates, indicated that to overcome such
problems, ballots should be mailed out at least forty-five days prior
to the election to ensure enough time for their return.244
Such problems not only affect the ballot itself but the registra-
tion and request for ballots that must be sent in order to receive a
ballot in the first place.  As stated above, UOCAVA authorizes
military and overseas voters to use the Federal Post Card Applica-
tion for registration and absentee ballot requests.245  Service mem-
bers appear to have difficulty, however, with the post cards.  The
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-765, at 10-11
(1986) (“Mail delivery is a problem for overseas voters.  Members of the military may
be in locations where mail service is sporadic, or they may be away for days or weeks
at a time on temporary duty or on maneuvers.  Among civilians overseas, missionaries
and Peace Corps Volunteers in particular often work in remote areas where mail de-
livery is slow.  Citizens working on oil rigs or on remote construction sites regularly
encounter mail delays.  Based on surveys of the U.S. Postal Service and of military
postal authorities, ballots should be mailed to overseas addresses at least 45 days prior
to an election in order to ensure adequate time for a ballot to reach a voter and be
returned.”).
242. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-484, OPERATION
IRAQI FREEDOM:  LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS HAMPERING MAIL DELIVERY NEED
TO BE RESOLVED 13 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04484.pdf.
243. Id.
244. See VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 241, at 5 (quoting U.S. ELECTION ASSIS-
TANCE COMM’N, REPORT, BEST PRACTICES FOR FACILITATING VOTING BY U.S. CITI-
ZENS COVERED BY THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING
ACT (2004), available at http://www.eac.gov/docs/UOCAVA%20Best%20Practices%
20Full%20Report.doc).
245. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff(b)(2) (2006).
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most recent Department of Defense survey of service members
concerning voting found these troubling results:
The Federal Post Card Application (FPCA), SF 76, is used to
register to vote and request an absentee ballot.  However, only
twenty-five percent of respondents were aware of the FPCA.
Absentee voters must also receive the FPCA in a timely manner
to properly register and be eligible to vote.  Only twenty-four
percent had received SF 76 by the January 15 deadline.  In addi-
tion, only twenty-five percent of the respondents were aware
that the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB), SF 186, is a
backup ballot that can be used if they did not receive the regular
absentee ballot.  Only eighteen percent were aware of the FVAP
Web site, and only fourteen percent knew of the Service or com-
ponent voting Web site.  Potentially, greater use and access to
voting Web sites could minimize the need for physical distribu-
tion of SF 76s.246
The proposed solution to the transit problem is clearly not serving
its function or is at least failing to meet its full potential.
These difficulties are exacerbated by the local election laws and
schedules established by states, often by statute, that dictate when
primary elections occur, when ballots can be produced, deadlines
for mailing ballots out to voters, and cut-off dates for the receipt
and counting of absentee ballots.247  Indeed, many of these restric-
tions come into direct conflict with federal statutes intended to
protect military and overseas voters and result in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) initiating litigation against states and lo-
calities seeking remedies that will help overcome the ballot transit
246. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT NO. IE-2006-
001, EVALUATION OF THE VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 4-5 (2006), available at
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Inspections/IE/Reports/FVAP%20Final%20Rpt%204-5-
2006%20(1).pdf.
247. Compare, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.221(3)(b) (West 2006) (“At the general
election, a ballot that is cast under section 6.22 by an elector who is a military elector,
that is received by mail from the U.S. postal service, and that is postmarked no later
than election day shall be counted as provided in this section if it is received by a
municipal clerk no later than 5 p.m. on the 10th day after the election.”), with COLO.
REV. STAT. § 1-8-303 (2006) (“The designated election official shall continue to de-
liver any envelopes containing absentee ballots that may be received thereafter up to
and including 7 p.m. on election day.”), and MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-637 (West
2007) (“Absentee ballots received by mail . . . must be received by the registrar by
5:00 p.m. on the date preceding the election; any received after such time shall be
handled as provided in [s]ection 23-15-647 and shall not be counted.”).  As can be
seen from these statutes, deadlines for the receipt of voted absentee ballots can vary
widely from the day before the election in Mississippi, to the day of election in Colo-
rado (and many other states), to ten days after the election so long as it is postmarked
by Election Day in Wisconsin.
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problem.  From 1988 through 2004, the DOJ brought more than
twenty enforcement actions under UOCAVA.248  A discussion of a
few of these cases will highlight the difficulties continually at issue
between state election officials and federal officials seeking to
guarantee military and overseas voters the ability to receive ballots
in a timely fashion.
The most famous instance of this type of litigation occurred even
before the current UOCAVA statutory framework was in place.  In
1980, the United States sued the State of Florida alleging that the
late scheduling of primary elections, resulting in the mailing of bal-
lots at the earliest twenty days before the general election and in
some cases only a few days before, violated the Overseas Citizens
Voting Rights Act because the late scheduling made it impossible
for such voters to return them before the statutory deadline of 7
p.m. on Election Day.249  The court provided injunctive relief for
the 1980 election mandating that ballots received within ten days of
Election Day must be counted.250  As the 1982 election ap-
proached, Florida and the United States entered into a consent de-
cree that allowed ballots to again be accepted for ten days after the
election and also required that absentee ballots be sent out thirty-
five days prior to the election.251  The court also required the state
to submit a plan of compliance showing that it had enacted suffi-
cient measures to ensure that overseas voters had a reasonable op-
portunity to receive and return their ballots.252  In 1984, when the
Florida Legislature failed to act to provide such measures to the
satisfaction of the court, the court ordered Florida to implement an
administrative rule, ultimately enacted as Florida Administrative
Code section 1S-2.013, containing the thirty-five-day advance mail-
ing requirement and the ten-day extension for receipt of ballots
after Election Day.253  Florida operated with an administrative rule
that directly contradicted a state statute for sixteen years without
much fanfare.
In 2000, after the statutorily mandated 7 p.m. Election Day
deadline, Florida received 2,411 overseas ballots which, if counted,
gave Bush/Cheney a 537 vote edge in the state and, if rejected,
248. See VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 241, at 5.
249. See id. at 7 (citing Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp.
2d 1317, 1321 (N.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000)).
250. Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321-22
(N.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000).
251. Id. at 1322; see also VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 241, at 7.
252. Harris, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
253. Id. at 1322-23.
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gave Gore/Lieberman a 202 vote edge.254  The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Florida therefore had to determine
whether a statute or administrative rule was the applicable stan-
dard for the counting of absentee ballots.  The court contradicted
precedent and ruled that the administrative rule superseded the di-
rectly contradictory statute because the rule was mandated by a
federal court as part of the enforcement of federal overseas and
military voting statutes.255  The resolution of a logistical problem
with the timely mailing of overseas ballots nearly twenty years
prior had a dramatic and decisive effect on the election of a
president.256
This same Florida administrative rule providing for an extension
for the return of UOCAVA ballots was again attacked following
the 2004 presidential election, this time by the American Civil Lib-
erties Union (“ACLU”) seeking to expand its protections to all ab-
sentee voters.257  The ACLU claimed that failing to provide the
ten-day extension for receipt of absentee ballots to all absentee
voters violated the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.258  The DOJ argued
that overseas and military voters, because of the logistical issues
involved with mailing such ballots recognized by Congress in pass-
ing the federal statutes, were legitimately distinguished from other
absentee voters.259  The court dismissed the ACLU claim.260
One would think with such a high-profile and consequential inci-
dent as the 2000 election controversy that states would take notice
of the logistical problems and legal ramifications of the issue of
254. Id. at 1320.
255. Id. at 1323-24.
256. But see Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d. 1305,
1315-16 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that overseas and military ballots that did not have
APO, FPO or foreign postmarks and for which no application was on record must be
counted pursuant to UOCAVA and other federal protections).
257. See generally Complaint, Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla.
2004) (No. 04-22787), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/fl%20absentee%20
final%20complaint.pdf
258. Friedman, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1358.
259. See De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that
distinction between those living abroad and those who do not is not a suspect class
and was supportable on a reasonable basis); see also Romeu v. Cohen, 121 F. Supp. 2d
264, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 265 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Howard v. State
Administrative Bd. of Election Laws, 976 F. Supp. 348, 352 (D. Md. 1996); VON
SPAKOVSKY, supra note 241, at 7; Letter from Sheldon T. Bradshaw, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alan S. Gold, U.S. Dist. Court Judge (Nov. 9, 2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/gold_ltr.htm.
260. See VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 241, at 7.
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military and overseas ballots and endeavor to avoid such situations.
This was not the case, however, and in 2004 the DOJ filed two
enforcement actions, one in Georgia and the other in Pennsylvania,
pertaining to the late mailing of absentee ballots by local election
officials.261  As discussed in a GAO report,
Georgia state law requires counties to have absentee ballots on
hand 45 days before a general election.  Georgia missed the Sep-
tember 20, 2002, deadline for the November 5, 2002, general
election because of the compressed election schedule in 2002.
The 45-day deadline was set to comply with federal mandates to
make it easier for U. S. military personnel stationed outside the
United States to vote.  Georgia had compressed its 2002 primary
and runoff election schedules such that the runoff was held only
49 days before the November 5 general election.  This precluded
the printing of the general election ballot in time for the mailing
deadline required under state law.  Georgia election officials
had contacted FVAP during the first week of October regarding
the state’s compliance with the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen
Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA).  Catoosa County ballots
omitted the names of the Republican candidate for the U.S.
Senate and the Republican gubernatorial candidate from the
ballot.  An allegation was made that this, among other absentee
ballot irregularities, violated UOCAVA because the correct bal-
lots, even if sent at the time this concern was raised on October
16, 2002, would not be received in time.  Georgia’s Secretary of
State asked DOJ to bring suit against the state to extend the
deadline for receipt of military and other absentee ballots.262
Despite this prior instance, Georgia again had a problem with
mailing absentee ballots in 2004, and the DOJ again brought suit to
force an extension in the deadline for receipt of overseas and mili-
tary ballots in the 2004 election.263  The court granted a three-day
extension in the deadline as well as “accelerated means for the
transmission and return of [UOCAVA] voters’ absentee ballots, in-
cluding facsimile, email, and express mail at public expense.”264
The case was ultimately resolved in 2005 by a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding that recognized that the Georgia General Assembly
261. See id. at 7-8.
262. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-1041R, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE’S ACTIVITIES TO ADDRESS PAST ELECTION-RELATED VOTING IRREGU-
LARITIES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d041041r.html.
263. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Ga. and Sec’y of State of Ga.
and the U.S., United States v. Georgia (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2005) (No. 1:04-CV-2040),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/ga_uocava2.htm.
264. Id.
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had taken sufficient steps to ensure long-term compliance with
UOCAVA.265
In Pennsylvania, similar litigation was required when multiple
county election boards failed to send out absentee ballots early
enough to comply with UOCAVA requirements.266  The court pro-
vided injunctive relief, extending the deadline for receipt of ballots
in the primary election statutorily set at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday
before Election Day, for twenty-one days and providing for over-
night delivery of ballots at state expense.267  The judge specifically
denied the DOJ’s request for relief to use technological means
such as facsimile and email even though it conceded that such pro-
cedures “‘make sense’ in this electronic age” because it “would in-
volve this Court devising and superimposing it’s [sic] own election
scheme on a complex legislatively sanctioned system spread across
sixty seven diverse counties.”268  This statement encapsulates much
of the tension between the federal government’s desire for ensur-
ing military and overseas voters a chance to vote and the localized
control over the mechanisms of voting.
Later in the election year, the same case was revitalized with re-
spect to the general election under circumstances that show that it
is not always the local control and scheduling of elections that can
cause problems for military voters.  Beginning on August 24, 2004,
Pennsylvania began issuing absentee ballots to overseas and mili-
tary voters, ultimately sending out a total of 26,739 ballots.269  The
problem arose when the eligibility of Ralph Nader to appear on the
Pennsylvania ballot was challenged, Nader was ordered removed
from the ballot, and was then allowed back on only to be removed
again as the case wound its way up the appeals process.270  As a
result, thousands of overseas and military voters received ballots
that were different than the one officially certified as correct.271
The federal government again intervened and sought relief in the
form of resending the ballots through electronic means or express
265. Id.
266. See Order, United States v. Commonwealth (M.D. Penn. Apr. 16, 2004) (No.
1:CV-04-830), available at http://www.dos.state.pa.us/dos/lib/dos/20/voting_case_tro.
pdf.
267. Id. at 5-6.
268. Id. at 4-5.
269. See Memorandum and Order, United States v. Commonwealth, 2004 WL
2384999 (M.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2004) (No. 1:CV-04-830), available at http://www.pamd.
uscourts.gov/opinions/kane/04v0830.pdf.
270. Id. at 1.
271. Id. at 1-3.
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mailing, and extension of the deadline for processing the ballots.272
The district court denied such relief on the grounds that doing so
would “harm the Pennsylvania election system and the public at
large by undermining the integrity and efficiency of Pennsylvania
elections,”273 and that “the ‘remedies’ proposed by the Govern-
ment invite unpredictability to an otherwise orderly and time
tested elections process.”274  The court failed to explain why this
was the case.275  The court could be faulted for not taking advan-
tage of all possible means of ensuring the timely transmission of
votes from military and other overseas voters, but the fault truly
lies at the feet of Congress as it continues to maintain the dual-
authority nature of federal elections.  The court was duly con-
cerned about treading too heavily on the state election procedures
and laws that Congress allows to dictate deadlines for federal
ballots.
Such battles between state and federal authorities have not
ended, and the U.S. government has filed several more lawsuits
during the most recent Congressional election regarding the mail-
ing of overseas ballots and deadlines for receipt from military vot-
ers.  In 2006, the DOJ brought actions and obtained either
injunctive relief or stipulated agreements from the states of Ala-
bama,276 South Carolina,277 Connecticut,278 and North Carolina.279
Despite years of efforts and multiple litigations, states thus con-
tinue to give short shrift to overseas and military voters in how
they handle election deadlines, ballot transmission, and absentee
deadlines.
These cases illustrate the continued tension and interaction be-
tween the state and federal governments concerning military and
overseas ballots.  The federal government is waging a continuing
struggle to ensure that such voters have enough time to receive
their ballots in the mail and return them for inclusion in the official
272. Id. at 8.
273. Id. at 8-9.
274. Id. at 10.
275. See id.
276. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Reso-
lutions to Protect Rights of Military and Overseas Citizens to Vote in Federal Primary
Elections in Alabama and South Carolina (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.us-
doj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06_crt_354.html
277. Id.
278. See Stipulated Agreement, United States v. State (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2006)
(No. 3:06-cv-1192), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/ct_cd.htm.
279. See Consent Decree, United States v. State (E.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 2006) (No.
5:06-cv-00118-H), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/misc/nc_uocava_cd.htm.
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tally within the context of state-mandated deadlines and primary
schedules.  Congress, however, has simply been unwilling to go the
extra step to ensure that such rights are not effectively hollow for
many military voters as a result of such deadlines.
As stated earlier, the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to
use its plenary power and take whatever steps it deems necessary
in conducting federal elections.280  Congress could simply dictate to
states the deadlines for sending, receiving, and counting federal
ballots.  The federal government’s Election Assistance Commission
recommended in 2004 that forty-five days be the minimum require-
ment for total transmission time of ballots from election officials to
overseas voters and their return.281  Table 2 shows, however, that as
of late 2004 only thirty states (plus the District of Columbia) had
laws requiring that ballots be sent overseas at least forty-five days
prior to the deadline for their return.  Twenty states failed to meet
the recommended time-frame for facilitating military and overseas
voting.282
TABLE 2. STATE BALLOT TRANSIT DEADLINES AND
TRANSMISSION METHODS283
Permit
Mail Delivery of Permit Permit
45 Day Ballots 30 Blank Return of Delivery of
Ballot or more Ballots to Voted Blank
Transit days prior Voters by Ballot by Ballots by
Time to elections Facsimile Facsimile Email
Alabama X
Alaska X X
Arkansas
280. See supra Part III.
281. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, REPORT: BEST PRACTICES FOR FA-
CILITATING VOTING BY U.S. CITIZENS COVERED BY THE UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS
CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT 5 (2004), available at http://www.eac.gov/docs/UO-
CAVA%20Best%20Practices%20Full%20Report.doc (stating that states should
“[m]ail absentee ballots at least 45 days prior to the deadline for receipt of voted
absentee ballots”).
282. See infra tbl.2.  Even when there was such a requirement, as the case from
Pennsylvania discussed above demonstrates, there was not always compliance and
other issues (such as candidates being taken off, put back on, and taken off again)
caused problems. See Memorandum and Order, United States v. Commonwealth,
2004 WL 2384999 (M.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2004) (No. 1:CV-04-830), available at http://
www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/kane/04v0830.pdf.
283. Adapted from U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, supra note 281, at
Exhibit 2.
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Permit
Mail Delivery of Permit Permit
45 Day Ballots 30 Blank Return of Delivery of
Ballot or more Ballots to Voted Blank
Transit days prior Voters by Ballot by Ballots by
Time to elections Facsimile Facsimile Email
California X
Colorado X X X
Connecticut X X
Delaware X
District of Columbia X X X X
Florida X X X X X
Georgia X X
Hawaii X X X
Idaho X X X
Illinois X X X
Indiana X X X X
Iowa X X
Kansas X X X X
Kentucky X X X
Louisiana X X X X X
Maine X X X X
Maryland X X X
Massachusetts X
Michigan X X
Minnesota X
Mississippi X X X X X
Missouri X
Montana X X X
Nebraska X X
Nevada X X
New Hampshire X
New Jersey X X X
New Mexico X X X X
New York X X
North Carolina X X X X
North Dakota X X X
Ohio X X X
Oklahoma X X X
Oregon X X X
Pennsylvania X X X
Puerto Rico X X
Rhode Island X X X X
South Carolina X X X X
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Permit
Mail Delivery of Permit Permit
45 Day Ballots 30 Blank Return of Delivery of
Ballot or more Ballots to Voted Blank
Transit days prior Voters by Ballot by Ballots by
Time to elections Facsimile Facsimile Email
South Dakota X
Tennessee X X
Texas X X X
Utah X X X
Vermont X X
Virginia X X X
Washington X X X
West Virginia X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X
TOTALS 31 47 31 22 6
This disparity could be eliminated if Congress mandated the
time-frames for absentee voting in federal elections instead of leav-
ing it up to the individual states, relying on the DOJ to individu-
ally, and as a result inefficiently, challenge every instance in which
it deems a state out of compliance with the general terms of UO-
CAVA.  Congress’ failure to do so leaves discretion in the hands of
both state officials and the enforcement division of the federal ex-
ecutive branch.  Military and other overseas voters are caught in
the middle.  Congress could create a much simpler and more uni-
fied system that ensures that state discretion does not effectively
disenfranchise such voters.  No such effort appears likely or even
within the current contemplation of Congress, given that the latest
attempt to address problems with overseas voting, HAVA, again
allowed significant state discretion.284
Absent such an endeavor, technology may ultimately provide the
solutions to such dilemmas by eliminating the problem of transit
time altogether.  Technology, however, is not a panacea and, de-
spite advances, has yet to provide a complete resolution to the con-
tinued difficulties faced by military and absentee voters.285
284. See Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat.
1666 Title VII (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (failing to
mandate procedures for states beyond requiring acceptance of postcard application
and federal write-in ballot, thereby preserving discretion by states in determining
deadlines for absentee voting).
285. See infra Part VI.
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VI. FROM PROCEDURES TO TECHNOLOGY
HAVA’s six legal changes to UOCAVA voting discussed above
are procedurally focused, attempting to make the existing by-mail
process work more efficiently.286  As shown above, however, the
primary problem with UOCAVA voting is ballot transit time,
something that can only be improved by improving mail delivery,
which is clearly outside the province of election reforms.287  So, in
2001, Congress passed a specific provision, as part of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (“2002 NDAA”),
concerning the use of technology to improve UOCAVA voting by
moving the ballot transit issue away from the mail and into cyber-
space.288  Specifically, section 1604(a)(1) of the 2002 NDAA states:
[T]he Secretary of Defense shall carry out a demonstration pro-
ject under which absent uniformed services voters are permitted
to cast ballots in the regularly scheduled general election for
Federal office for November 2002 through an electronic voting
system.  The project shall be carried out with participation of
sufficient numbers of absent uniformed services voters so that
the results are statistically relevant.289
This requirement was designed to experiment using technology,
as opposed to merely procedural improvements, as a means to
solve the problems UOCAVA voters face in receiving and re-
turning absentee ballots within the time restraints of state-run fed-
eral elections.  The desire to find technological solutions to the
UOCAVA problem recognizes that the continued reliance on state
and local actors, variations in state election laws, and limitations on
addressing ballot transit hinder UOCAVA voting.  Technology can
allow the local election official and the voter to transmit informa-
tion immediately, thereby solving one of the critical roadblocks in
UOCAVA voting.
In recent years, it has become clear that technology may play an
important role in addressing the issues associated with UOCAVA
voting.  FVAP, which oversees UOCAVA voting, is uniquely situ-
ated in the federal government to promote the use of technology to
286. See generally 116 Stat. 1666.
287. See generally Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L.
No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 39
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.).
288. See Pub. L. No. 107-107, 115 Stat. 1012 (2001) (codified as amended as Elec-
tronic Voting Demonstration Project, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff).
289. Id. § 1604(a)(1).
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facilitate voting.290  The voters with which FVAP are primarily
identified, military voters, are a popular population in political cir-
cles to serve, leading to little controversy in efforts to improve the
miitary’s ability to vote.  Additionally, by being housed in the De-
partment of Defense, FVAP is able to leverage the budget and
technological inclination of the Department to its advantage.
FVAP, unlike Congress, lacks the power to coerce local election
officials into adopting new technologies, nor can it bypass local
election officials to facilitate UOCAVA voting.291  Instead, FVAP
can support and promote technological innovation by the local
governments that serve UOCAVA voters.292  This process of identi-
fying and supporting “champions” is common in voluntary technol-
ogy adoptions; the United Kingdom uses this strategy to test
electronic voting in local elections.293  Champions tend to be lead-
ers in their field who want to use new technologies and have the
capacity—including personnel, experience, and resources—to
make pilot adoptions work.294  Without the power to coerce in-
volvement, champions are often the only ones who are likely to
want to participate; FVAP, therefore, often works with only cham-
pions who adopt their own innovations.
One problem with this use of champions is the difficulty in
knowing how well the program will work in other jurisdictions.  In-
novation helps voters in the most progressive communities cast bal-
lots while others are left behind.  The history of the adoption of
innovative solutions to serve UOCAVA voters, therefore, appears
in many ways similar to the historical issues surrounding procedu-
ral reforms as it is both piecemeal and, to date, ineffective at ad-
dressing the problems faced by voters overseas.  Nonetheless, over
the last fourteen years, FVAP has worked to promote the use of
new technologies that address the transit time and voter error
problems through fax machines, Internet, and email voting.
290. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ABSENTEE
VOTING ASSISTANCE TO UNIFORMED SERVICES MEMBERS AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS,
http://www.fvap.gov (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
291. See Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, ch. 656, 69 Stat. 584 (repealed
1986).
292. Id.
293. See generally LAWRENCE PRATCHETT, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTRONIC
VOTING IN THE UK (2002), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/elections/e-voting/pdf/
e-voting.pdf.
294. For examples of this from the private sector, see generally RICHARD FOSTER,
INNOVATION: THE ATTACKER’S ADVANTAGE (1986); see also ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, THE CHANGE MASTERS: INNOVATIONS FOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE AMERI-
CAN CORPORATION (1983).
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A. Fax Balloting
The Gulf War and the military buildup that preceded the war,
Operation Desert Shield, were the first large-scale military opera-
tions undertaken since the Vietnam War.  This new war footing al-
lowed FVAP to initiate an innovative use of fax technology to
facilitate voting.295  Specifically, FVAP provided for a centralized
data collection and transmission program for faxed ballots.296  This
Electronic Transmission Service (“ETS”) served as a broker be-
tween the local election official (“LEO”) and the voter.  LEOs
faxed voting information—ballots and other election informa-
tion—to the ETS, and the ETS then transmitted that information
to the voter.297  With cast ballots, the process was reversed.298  Hav-
ing a process centralized through the ETS created several impor-
tant benefits.  First, the ETS was a one-stop shop, since voters and
LEOs only needed to know one fax number to transmit election
materials.299  Second, the ETS operated twenty-four hours a day,
receiving ballots securely and then retransmitting them to the voter
or LEO at specific times.300  This kept LEOs from receiving ballots
in an unsecured manner, which was important since secrecy was
one of the key victims of voting by facsimile.
During the two months that the system operated in 1990, 1,675
voters took advantage of the fax system.301  In 2004, many more
took advantage of the fax system to request ballots.302  With the
large number of troops abroad, the ETS processed 46,614 faxes for
the forty-four states that allowed the FPCA to be faxed.303  This
295. Ralph C. Keikkila, The Electronic Transmission of Election Materials, in 12
INNOVATIONS IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 1, 1 (Federal Election Commission, No.
12, 1995).
296. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., 2006-07 VOTING AS-
SISTANCE GUIDE app. B (last updated Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.fvap.gov/
pubs/vag/pdfvag/appendix_b.pdf (providing central number for UOCAVA voters to
fax voting material).
297. See, e.g., Auditor’s Instructions: Absentee Ballot Email or Fax Transmissions
To and From UOCAVA Voters 1-2, http://www.sos.state.ia.us/pdfs/elections/auditors/
UOCAVA_Instruct.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) (instructing Iowa LEOs on how to
fax material to FVAP transmission center and that FVAP center will return fax of
voter’s application and ballot).
298. Id. at 2.
299. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 296, app. B at 455.
300. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION SER-
VICE MANUAL, INSTRUCTION TO LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS 8 (2006), available at
http://www.fvap.gov/leo/etsinstructforleos.pdf (stating that the ETS accepts faxes and
emails twenty-four hours per day and seven days per week.)
301. See Keikkila, supra note 295.
302. See Stewart, supra note 25, at 19.
303. Id.
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included 38,194 post card applications from military voters for bal-
lots and 1,844 blank ballots sent from LEOs to voters.304  Only 879
voted ballots, however, were faxed to election officials through the
ETS.305  These numbers concerning the fax system point out two
sets of limitations to this system.  First, as reflected by the low num-
ber of voted ballots sent through the ETS, voters believe the sys-
tem is not private; their vote is being cast in the open and can be
seen by the person receiving the ballot in the LEO office.306  The
voter must choose between having a public ballot cast and not cast-
ing a ballot at all.  The second, and more critical, limitation is the
issue of local adoption and utilization of the system as shown by
how few ballots were faxed through the system.  While it is difficult
to tell how many ballots were faxed directly from LEOs to over-
seas voters, the very low percentage of LEOs using the centralized
ETS for returning blank ballots to voters likely indicates that
LEOs are still using the mail as a means of sending out the bal-
lot.307  Reasons for this low LEO usage rate could include varying
LEO ability to adopt and utilize the new technologies (i.e. facsim-
ile machines), LEO staff knowledge of how to operate the system,
or lack of secure locations to place the machine and the cast ballots
so that ballots are not received or stored in an inappropriate
environment.
Lack of secrecy is one of the main problems with transmitting
ballots by facsimile, as it is difficult to separate the identity of the
voter from the ballot, and the information is transmitted through a
third party.308  One example of how such issues play out is Califor-
nia’s attempt to deal with the secrecy issue.  California requires
overseas voters who are allowed to vote by facsimile309 to also sign
a waiver of secrecy that states as follows:
I, __________, acknowledge that by returning my voted ballot by
facsimile transmission I have waived my right to have my ballot
kept secret.  Nevertheless, I understand that, as with any absent
voter, my signature, whether on this oath of voter form or my
identification envelope, will be permanently separated from my
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See id. (noting that military voters sent 38,194 FPCAs through the ETS central
facsimile system but that LEOs only faxed 1,844 blank ballots via the ETS).
308. See id. at 19 n.1.
309. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3103.5 (West 2004) (“A special absentee voter who is
temporarily living outside of the territorial limits of the United States or the District
of Columbia may return his or her ballot by facsimile transmission.”).
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voted ballot to maintain its secrecy at the outset of the tabula-
tion process and thereafter.310
This waiver was initially deemed to violate the California Constitu-
tion’s provision that all voting should be in secret.311  Subsequently,
the California Court of Appeal reversed and made the following
highly salient observation:
In our view, given a choice between fax voting and not voting at
all, citizens should be able to choose to vote by fax and to waive
their right to a secret ballot.  In such circumstances, voting by
fax is a “reasonable measure . . . to facilitate and increase exer-
cise of the right to vote.”312
This view seems to be gaining popularity among states.  Accord-
ing to the Election Assistance Commission, twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia allow for the return of ballots by facsim-
ile.313  Military voters send ballots through the centralized FVAP
program and sign a waiver similar to California’s, which states: “I
understand that by faxing my voted ballot I am voluntarily waiving
my right to a secret ballot.”314
Federal courts have had limited review of voting by facsimile,
but those that have addressed the issue have expressed contradic-
tory views.  In the two recent cases brought by the DOJ to enforce
UOCAVA protections in Georgia and Pennsylvania, the courts
each took a different tactic.  The Pennsylvania district court high-
lighted many of the concerns with voting by facsimile, and de-
scribed fax and electronic mail voting as “problematic” as these
methods “are not legislatively sanctioned, are incapable of imple-
mentation by all counties, and they deprive voters of the right of
secrecy.”315
In contrast, the Georgia district court specifically ordered that
ballots be accepted by facsimile and proscribed a specific proce-
dure for doing so:
The Georgia Secretary of State and the registrars of Georgia’s
159 counties are given the authority to send requested ballots to
310. See id.
311. See Bridgeman v. McPherson, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
312. Id. at 819 (quoting Peterson v. San Diego, 34 Cal. 3d 225 (1983)).
313. See supra tbl.2; see also FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., 2006-07 VOTING ASSISTANCE GUIDE Ch. 3: State Absentee Registration and
Voting Procedures: Alabama to Wyoming, available at http://www.fvap.gov/pubs/vag/
vagchapter3.html [hereinafter FVAP Ch. 3].
314. FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 296, at 455.
315. United States v. Commonwealth, No. 1:CV-04-830, 2004 WL 2384999, at *6
(M.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2004).
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voters by facsimile transmission or email and to accept the re-
turned of voter oaths and voted ballots to a single secure facsim-
ile machine that is under the supervision of the Secretary of
State.  The Secretary shall promptly place each ballot received
via facsimile in a sealed unmarked envelope and place that en-
velope within a second envelope containing the voter’s oath.
The Secretary shall then immediately transmit the ballots by
overnight or personal delivery to the election superintendent in
the appropriate county for verification and counting with all
other absentee ballots.  Transmission of returned voted ballots
under this order may be made directly from the voter via facsim-
ile, or may originate as image files sent via electronic mail to the
Federal Voting Assistance Program’s read-only computer facili-
ties and then relayed to the Secretary via facsimile.  In duplicat-
ing the received facsimiles of the ballots for purposes of
permitting those ballots to be read by the appropriate counting
equipment, the county election officials shall use the duplication
of ballot procedures and the vote review panel as described in
state law in order to assure the integrity of the ballot duplication
process.316
These cases highlight the fact that facsimile voting is gaining ac-
ceptance as a means of resolving ballot transmission time problems
for overseas voters but still faces some reservations or outright op-
position because of its lack of secrecy.  As has been seen in other
areas, there is a patchwork of state laws concerning the acceptance
of facsimile ballots,317 which could be resolved by stronger and
more direct congressional measures.  The combination of this vari-
ation and the lack of security means that facsimile voting still has
to make significant progress for it to be accepted as the solution to
the problems associated with overseas voting.
B. Internet Voting
In contrast to the security problems faced by facsimile voting,
Internet voting, both directly over the Internet and through trans-
mission of ballots over email, offers at least the hope of instantane-
ous electronic transmission, security, and secrecy.  In practice,
however, it has not proven to fulfill this potential.  In keeping with
its role as an innovator, FVAP has promoted projects to test the
effectiveness of both email and Internet voting for the UOCAVA
population.  The first Internet voting project that FVAP promoted
316. Order, United States v. State, Section A (N.D. Ga. July 15, 2004) (No. 1:04-
CV-2040), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/ga_uocava.htm.
317. See supra tbl.2.
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was the Voting Over the Internet (“VOI”) pilot project, which
sought to test the feasibility of remote registration and voting over
the Internet.318  VOI was a proof of concept design to ascertain
whether secure and accessible Internet voting could be deployed
for FVAP clients. 319  The project was a cooperative effort between
federal, state, and local governments with FVAP acting as the Pro-
gram Manager.  Four states (Florida, South Carolina, Texas, and
Utah) and four specific counties (Okaloosa and Orange Counties
in Florida, Dallas County in Texas, and Weber County in Utah320)
agreed to participate in the program for the November 2000 presi-
dential election.321  The pilot project identified 127 potential par-
ticipants, ninety-one of whom registered and eighty-four of whom
voted over the system.322
The system issues digital certificates and passwords to potential
voters who can then log onto the FVAP server.  The voter then:
selects the voting residence from the drop-down menu, and re-
quests to vote (i.e., requests a blank E-Ballot).  The VOI System
logs the date and time the E-Ballot request is made.  The citizen
receives the E-Ballot, votes it, and submits the encrypted, voted
E-Ballot after signing it using the digital certificate and pass-
word.  The FVAP server “postmarks” the E-Ballot and forwards
it to the appropriate LEO server.  The LEO server issues an
immediate message to the citizen acknowledging that the E-Bal-
lot has been received.  If the citizen has any questions about the
status of the voted E-Ballot at any time, he/she can access the
Check Status feature.  The LEOs set their individually deter-
mined parameters to specify when to stop providing blank E-
Ballots.  That date and time are based on the deadline mandated
by state election law.323
318. See generally R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK AND
VOTE:  THE FUTURE OF INTERNET VOTING (2004) (discussing the problems associ-
ated with UOCAVA voting in detail, as well as the VOI project).
319. FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., VOTING OVER THE IN-
TERNET PILOT PROJECT ASSESSMENT REPORT ES-1 (2001), available at http://www.
fvap.gov/services/voireport.pdf [hereinafter DEFENSE, VOI REPORT].
320. The importance to some state governments of UOCAVA procedures that are
technologically-focused can be seen in the case of Utah.  Utah enacted legislation
stating: “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, any county may, if selected
by the Department of Defense, participate in the Federal Voting Assistance Program
pilot project to allow military and voters overseas as defined by Section 20A-3-403 to
register to vote and cast their votes electronically.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-6-103
(2006).  Without such legislative permission, counties and LEOs cannot engage in ex-
periments of this type.
321. See DEFENSE, VOI REPORT, supra note 319, at ES-1. R
322. Id. at 2-2.
323. Id. at 3-5.
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From the LEO side, processing is done in a similar manner:
To process E-Ballots, the LEO logs on to the LEO server and
views the Ballot Reconciliation Table, reconciles the E-Ballots
and validates them using the same criteria as the by-mail pro-
cess.  If any ballots are invalidated, the LEO can enter a reason.
A handwritten signature comparison does not need to be per-
formed because the citizen has already been authenticated by
the FVAP server.  The encrypted E-Ballots remain stored in the
LEO server database.324
The stated goal of the VOI project was to mirror the process used
for paper, mail-in absentee ballots to the greatest degree possible
while still maintaining proper security.325
VOI was also designed to address each problem associated with
the UOCAVA voting process.  It had a voter registration compo-
nent to facilitate voters completing the first step in the voting pro-
cess successfully.326  Voters requested a ballot online and could
check the status of their registration and ballot request, thus mak-
ing any voter error in the process known quickly.327  The Internet
also solved the problems associated with ballot transit, as all com-
munication occurs almost instantaneously over the Internet.328
Also, because voters were using an electronic voting platform, it
was possible to design a voting system that was more accurate and
effective than the absentee voting technologies.329  Problems asso-
ciated with ballot rejection could also be minimized because the
LEOs designed their own ballots within the system to meet the
requirements of their individual jurisdictions.330
The VOI pilot project’s assessment report reached three basic
conclusions.  First, the technology worked; there were no major
problems with the VOI system.331  Second, within the scope of the
pilot project, the risks introduced into the remote registration and
voting process by technology could be mitigated and the integrity
of the electoral process could be maintained.332  The report also
noted that the Internet voting system had the potential to enhance
324. Id. at 3-6.
325. Id. at 3-5.
326. Id. at 3-1 to 3-2.
327. See id. at 3-2.
328. Id. at 4-16 to 4-18.
329. See id. at 6-12 to 6-13.
330. See id. at 1-5.
331. See id. at 4-1 to 4-33.
332. See id. at 4-2.
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the accessibility of the electoral process for UOCAVA citizens.333
Third, the VOI pilot showed that FVAP could collaborate success-
fully with state and local election officials in the development and
implementation of an Internet voting system.334  Because FVAP re-
lied on these state and local officials to carry out the provisions of
UOCAVA, the success of this collaboration was a critical element
and a harbinger of the possibility of successful collaborations in the
future.  Ultimately, however, the assessment concluded that the
system was not sufficiently “mature,” and that further development
was needed for “Internet remote registration and voting [to] be
provided effectively, reliably, and securely on a large scale.”335
A scaled-up Internet voting experiment in 2004 was planned as
another step towards such further development.  The Secure Elec-
tronic Registration and Voting Experiment (“SERVE”) would
have been implemented in fifty counties in seven states across the
country to serve the UOCAVA population, including up to an ex-
pected 100,000 votes in the 2004 primary and general election cy-
cle.336  A report prepared by four computer scientists asked by the
FVAP to review the system, however, raised concerns about the
security of Internet voting and its vulnerability to cyber-attack and
led the Department of Defense to cancel the experiment.337  It is
therefore unclear whether the Internet will be a tool in the continu-
ing effort to facilitate the franchise of military and overseas voters
despite its promise.
C. Email Voting
Finally, FVAP has also encouraged localities to use email to fa-
cilitate the transfer of voting information and ballots under the
2002 NDAA mandate.338  For example, in the 2002 elections,
twenty-two jurisdictions in Virginia engaged in pilot email absentee
333. Id. at ES-2, 4-12 to 4-28 (noting reduction in problems caused by inaccuracies
or unclear data, reduction in ballot transit time, reduction in burdens causes by mobil-
ity, and benefits to centralization).  For further discussion of the debate about In-
ternet voting and accessibility, see generally R. Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler,
The Likely Consequences of Internet Voting for Political Representation, 34 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1115 (2001).
334. See DEFENSE, VOI REPORT, supra note 319, at 4-10 to 4-11. R
335. Id. at ES-2.
336. See DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE ELEC-
TRONIC REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) 4 (2004), available at
http://www.servesecurityreport.org/paper.pdf [hereinafter JEFFERSON ET AL.,
SERVE].
337. See id. at 16.
338. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 296, app. B at 456.
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voting efforts for UOCAVA citizens.339  Because of the events of
September 11, 2001 and the resulting increase in military members
overseas, Cameron Quinn, the Secretary of the Virginia State
Board of Elections, declared an election emergency for all active-
duty military voters deployed outside the United States.340  Ac-
cording to the statute:
The provisions of this section shall apply in the case of an emer-
gency that will not allow sufficient time for the distribution and
handling of absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots, in
accordance with the procedures of this title, for qualified voters
who are unable to vote in person because of the emergency.
The Secretary of the State Board of Elections shall have the au-
thority to designate alternative methods and procedures to han-
dle such applications and ballots.341
Under the emergency order, election boards were directed to
email an absentee ballot—as the alternate method and proce-
dure—to the email address that an eligible absentee voter had pro-
vided on her absentee ballot request.342  The packet sent to the
voter included the ballot, cover letter, and instructions, all of which
were prepared by the State Board of Elections.343
How successful was this pilot?  The fifteen voters who requested
ballots, seven of whom returned ballots that were counted, re-
ported that they found the program to be exciting.344  The primary
problems that voters encountered included technical problems with
downloading the ballot file, which was about 800 KB, while elec-
tion administrators had to combat problems associated with illegi-
ble or incorrect email addresses.345  The other issue, of course, was
low participation, which Virginia officials ascribed largely to a lack
of competitive races on the ballot—incumbent Republican Senator
339. See VA. BD. OF ELECTIONS, REPORT: EMERGENCY EMAIL ABSENTEE VOTING
& PILOT PROGRAMS (unpublished internal report) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
VA. BD., REPORT].
340. Press Release, Va. Bd. of Elections, Virginia Announces Emergency Voting
Procedures for Overseas Military Voters and Pilot Program for Other Uniformed and
Overseas Voters (Sept. 6, 2002), available at http://www.sbe.state.va.us/cms/Absentee_
Voting/Military_Overseas_Citizens/Press_Release.html [hereinafter Press Release].
341. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-713 (2002).
342. See Press Release, supra note 340. R
343. See VA. BD., REPORT, supra note 339.  The exception was Loudoun County,
which prepared its own documents.
344. See id.
345. Id.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ303.txt unknown Seq: 56 20-SEP-07 10:57
990 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
John Warner ran unopposed—and voters unaware of the pilot
initiative.346
So while email ballot delivery is potentially promising, it has yet
to be tested on a large scale and its potential therefore remains
uncertain.  Some states used email balloting in the 2006 election
cycle, as we were conducting the research for this Article.347  Fur-
thermore, while some methods of email ballot delivery suffer from
many of the problems associated with fax ballot delivery (espe-
cially privacy and security), technologies for securing email and
documents delivered via email are rapidly advancing (certainly for
members of the Armed Forces).
VII. THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY ABSENTEE VOTING AND
A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
The concept of enfranchising military personnel has steadily
evolved.  It started with expanding military voting via absentee and
remote polling places while soldiers were still on American soil,
progressed to fully enfranchising overseas military personnel, and
now seeks to facilitate voting to the highest degree possible within
the constraints of state election regulations.  Congress has the con-
stitutional authority to regulate nearly all aspects of the mecha-
nisms of voting in federal elections and has conditionally exercised
that power in an effort to ensure military personnel, and other
overseas voters, the greatest possible opportunity to receive and
return absentee ballots without fully taking over the entire pro-
cess.348  Through statutory action, Congress has created a central
entity—the Federal Voting Assistance Program—that advocates
for and facilitates voting by UOCAVA citizens.349  FVAP has
346. Id.
347. As of May 2006, ten states (North Dakota, South Carolina, Montana, Missis-
sippi, Florida, Virginia, Wisconsin, Washington, Illinois, and Missouri) allowed some
form of email balloting, according to information provided by the Federal Voting As-
sistance Program. See States that Allow Emailing of Ballots, VOTING INFORMATION
NEWS (Fed. Voting Assistance Program, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Washington, D.C.), May
2006, available at http://www.fvap.gov/pubs/vin/html06vins/may06vin.html.  In August
2006, Iowa announced that it would also allow email ballot delivery and return. See
Posting of Michael Alvarez to Election Updates, http://electionupdates.caltech.edu/
2006/08/iowas-overseas-military-to-use-email.html.  At the time we write this Article,
there is little information available about how these email initiatives fared in the 2006
elections. See Ellen Nakashima, E-Mail Voting Comes with Risks, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 2006, at A19 (noting that it is difficult to tell how many soldiers use email for
voting but that “[a]necdotally, the number of military personnel voting by email ap-
pears limited”).
348. See supra Part III.
349. See supra Parts IV & V.
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worked with the states to lower the procedural barriers to UO-
CAVA voting by encouraging states to create uniform laws that
mandate easier ballot requests, a longer time to cast ballots, and a
minimum number of days for ballot transit.350  Congress has yet to
exercise its power to the fullest degree available to mandate that
states comply with standardized election procedures, leading to
continued problems for military voters in navigating the various
state election laws.  As shown above, the legal remedies that Con-
gress has been willing to provide are often simply not enough to
enable those living and fighting abroad the ability to receive a bal-
lot and vote because of continuing difficulties related to ballot
transit time.  The advance towards fully realized enfranchisement is
therefore incomplete, and there is still room for additional proce-
dural innovations.
But the focus of enfranchising military voters is rapidly shifting
from procedural improvements to technological innovations, as it
avoids the highly intrusive steps that total federalization would en-
tail.  Clearly, technology provides a theoretical solution to the bal-
lot transit time problem by minimizing the time that it can take for
a military voter to request a ballot, receive a blank ballot, and re-
turn a voted ballot.  Furthermore, with advances in technology,
electronic balloting for military voters might make for a more accu-
rate, accessible, private, and secure voting experience than military
voters now face when they use paper ballot request forms or bal-
lots, often sent through postal services that may not be highly se-
cure or that fail to ensure privacy.  But there simply have been too
few serious attempts to develop, implement, and test new technolo-
gies for ballot delivery to military voters, and thus new technolo-
gies remain poorly tested and poorly developed, and may thus fall
short of the requirements for full implementation for all military
and overseas voters.
The key problem with technological innovation has not necessa-
rily been with the technology itself but with issues raised by inter-
est groups over aspects of trials of these technologies.351  Concerns
over security and secrecy have even hampered scaling up successful
pilot initiatives into large-scale tests, let alone into operational pro-
350. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(a)(2) (2006) (mandating that each state “accept and
process, with respect to any election for Federal office, any otherwise valid voter re-
gistration application and absentee ballot application from an absent uniformed ser-
vices voter or overseas voter, if the application is received by the appropriate State
election official not less than 30 days before the election”).
351. See generally JEFFERSON ET AL., SERVE, supra note 336 (criticizing SERVE). R
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grams.  Some of these concerns are based upon real issues associ-
ated with the use of new technologies for ballot delivery and
receipt; some, no doubt, arise from the political uncertainty about
the potential impact of thousands of new ballots received from
heretofore disenfranchised military voters.  Nonetheless, if the past
is any indication, the ongoing deployment of a sizeable population
of troops abroad will spur innovation and changes in the law to
help facilitate military voting.  Supporting military voters is both
politically popular and normatively laudable, so there is room for
procedural and technological progress aimed at enfranchising mili-
tary and overseas voters.  If Congress provides the statutory gui-
dance and funding, and state and local election officials work
constructively with federal officials, it is likely that a fully realized
technological answer to the ongoing troubles in absentee voting
could eventually be developed that alleviates most, if not all, of the
difficulties faced by overseas and military voters.  Congress has
taken steps in the right direction with UOCAVA, HAVA, and the
2002 NDAA, but there is still work to do to adequately serve those
who serve the country.
Indeed, the problems that arise when military personnel, their
families, and other citizens overseas attempt to exercise their right
to vote illustrate the limits of pure legal strategies designed to en-
franchise voters by improving only procedural access to voting.
The laws for UOCAVA voters—both federal and across the states
and territories—vary in robustness but generally are designed to
provide procedural access to the polls.352  At the federal level, the
UOCAVA statute, HAVA, and other legislation contain provisions
intended to overcome informational limits, point of contact issues,
and registration difficulties that afflict the UOCAVA populations.
HAVA, for example, explicitly extends the length of validity of a
UOCAVA voter’s registration.  Implicit in these legal reforms is
the idea that the voter can meaningfully cast a ballot given the fact
that they are enfranchised by various legal schemes.
Unfortunately, the problems of UOCAVA voting that have ex-
isted throughout the history of attempts to allow military person-
nel, their families, and other citizens overseas to vote (including
those problems seen in recent elections) are certain to be seen in
2008.  The reason for these continued problems is simple:  the chal-
lenge of UOCAVA voting is one of technology as well as the law.
The ballot transit issue that has stymied UOCAVA voting for 100
352. See FVAP Ch. 3, supra note 313.
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years will continue to be a problem because mail service continues
to have limits, especially given the multi-governmental aspect of
international mail transport.  Moreover, many states have begun to
adopt so-called “voter-verification” requirements that state that
any electronic ballot must produce a contemporaneous “audit
trail” that can be used for auditing purposes.353  Although similar
technologies have been used in Europe, allowing for electronic bal-
lot voter verification, such systems are unlikely to be used or al-
lowed in the U.S. 2008 elections.354
The politics of Internet and electronic voting play strongly in the
debate over improving technological access to the vote for UO-
CAVA voters.  In 2004, SERVE’s cancellation was in part predi-
cated by the concern that the effort to enfranchise military voters
was political; some perceived this project as the Department of De-
fense’s attempt to turn out Republican military votes.  Similarly,
the concern about vote tampering has brought greater scrutiny to
efforts to allow military voters to cast ballots using facsimile tech-
nology.  Such concerns are likely to surface again in 2008.
Furthermore, the political landscape of American politics is
likely to keep UOCAVA voting issues at the center of debate.
First, many observers of American politics note the highly po-
larized atmosphere that exists between “blue” and “red” states,
and this political polarization is unlikely to wane following the re-
cent partisan shift in congressional representation from Republi-
cans to Democrats.355  Second, the 2008 presidential election is for
an open presidential seat, and while as we write this Article the
first primaries are still many months away, there are already at
least a dozen candidates in each major party who have taken some
step towards entering the 2008 race.  The 2008 election promises to
be a closely contested and expensive race, one where in the end, a
few hundred votes in a critical state (like Florida in the 2000 elec-
tion) might provide the difference between a Republican or Demo-
cratic Electoral College victory.  Finally, while the exact Electoral
College calculus is now uncertain, and will depend on the configur-
ation of party nominees and their running mates, it is likely that
353. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase:  Electronic Voting and Democratic Val-
ues, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1793 (2005).
354. See ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 318, at 142-46.
355. For a discussion of the polarization of American political life, see generally
STANLEY B. GREENBERG, THE TWO AMERICAS: OUR CURRENT POLITICAL DEAD-
LOCK AND HOW TO BREAK IT (St. Martin’s Press 2005) (2004); see also generally
THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?  HOW CONSERVATIVES WON
THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004).
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some of the most closely contested states may be those with large
populations of military voters and dependents, or citizens who live
overseas.356
Thus, the partisan divide among political elites, close presidential
elections, and the Electoral College, all interact to make technolog-
ical reforms that can enfranchise UOCAVA voters highly contro-
versial.  Moreover, the two resources needed for technological
experimentation are sorely lacking at present.  The first resource
needed is money: developing technological solutions for the UO-
CAVA voting problem, and testing those solutions scientifically,
will not be cheap.  The Democratic takeover of Congress and the
subsequent re-introduction of so-called “Pay-Go” budgeting rules,
coupled with growing scrutiny over the budget of the Department
of Defense, limits the likelihood that funds will be identified and
earmarked to support technological improvements to the UO-
CAVA voting process.357  The second resource lacking is federal,
state, and local election officials willing to work as “champions” of
such reforms.  Implementation of innovation typically requires
having a champion who will work to address problems and over-
come obstacles that arise in the first use of a technology.  Even in
the best political environment, such innovations require strong
champions who can acquire resources, foster a positive legal envi-
ronment (technology reforms often conflict with procedural legal
requirements), and generate excitement needed to motivate actors
to participate in new projects.  Given the highly litigious and hos-
tile environment that exists today with election reform, such cham-
pions are not likely to emerge, even though anecdotal evidence
indicates that election officials are aware of, and concerned about,
the problems facing UOCAVA voters.
Thus, as we look to the future, and to the steps that should be
taken to ensure that UOCAVA voters have the same ability to cast
a ballot, in a user-friendly, easy, accessible, verifiable, and secure
manner—and to have the same assurance that voters who live in
their voting jurisdictions have when they cast their ballots in per-
son or remotely that their ballots are counted in a way consistent
with their intent—we see that technology holds the key for en-
356. For example, Florida and New Mexico may again prove important in the Elec-
toral College calculus in 2008, as may Colorado and other Mountain West states with
military bases.  For more on the Electoral College and these calculations, see DARON
R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270:  THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CAMPAIGN STRAT-
EGIES OF 2000 AND 2004 (2006).
357. See Lori Montgomery, House Adopts Pay-As-You-Go Rules, WASH. POST, Jan.
6, 2007, at A04.
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franchising UOCAVA voters.  This will require a research and de-
velopment effort, and a long-term commitment by election officials
at the federal, state, and local levels.  A policy framework that pro-
vides resources for technology development and experimentation
is needed, as well as the development of flexibility in UOCAVA
voting policies and procedures that can allow for pilot testing and
experimentation of new technological approaches to voting.  For
example, resources should be made available for jurisdictions to
study, test, and implement technologies for the use of various
forms of Internet-based ballot provision to UOCAVA voters—
both through email and web-based systems; to what extent can pro-
viding the balloting materials to UOCAVA voters through the In-
ternet, where they then print and return the ballot by traditional
mail or fax, alleviate some if not all of the ballot transit time prob-
lem?  What problems arise with Internet-based ballot provision,
and do methods like this for ballot provision increase the usability,
accuracy, and reliability of the voting process for UOCAVA vot-
ers?  And if we can develop ballot provision systems that are
shown by research to work well, can we then develop technologies
that will resolve ballot return issues, again without sacrificing se-
curity, usability, accessibility, and accuracy?358  Only by undertak-
ing pilot projects and experiments, studies that are backed by solid
and scientific evaluation, can we learn exactly how technology can
improve the UOCAVA voting experience, and thereby work to
better enfranchise the millions of Americans who live and work
overseas, including those who are stationed overseas in the Armed
Forces.
Interestingly, in the long-term we may learn much about how to
improve UOCAVA voting, with technology, as a by-product of the
positive culture toward voting technology and innovation that now
exists in Europe.  Many European countries currently engage in
Internet voting experiments, including the Estonia, France, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.359  Research-
ers throughout the world are closely studying these experiments
and pilot projects, and we expect to learn much about both the
technology and the behavioral effects of using these technologies
for voting.  These projects will increase the overall knowledge re-
garding what are the successful paths to Internet voting and similar
358. See ALVAREZ & HALL, supra note 318, ch. 8, for a complete discussion of
proposals aimed at developing a research and development effort, with strong, sci-
ence-based evaluation, of Internet-based approaches for voting systems.
359. See id. at 142-46 for a discussion of these pilots.
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efforts to use technology to enfranchise voters.  Although this
knowledge will not benefit UOCAVA voters in 2008, it is likely to
create the basis for future experiments in the United States with
Internet and remote voting for UOCAVA voters.
